ARTICLES

ARTICLES
Flexibility in achieving its mission is a second critical organizational factor for the infantry.
The infantry achieves its primary goal of closing with and destroying the enemy on its feet,
which implies that it must be organized to get onto its objectives through the most appropriate
means possible. This flexibility of insertion must not be a trait unique to light battalions, but
rather a general characteristic of the infantry. The infantry must be supported by vehicles, not
defined by them, and doctrine and organization cannot view vehicle-enabled manoeuvre as
the baseline for mission success. The infantry achieves its flexibility through arming the man,
not manning the arms.
Finally, the modern infantry battalion must be inherently deployable. Deployability comes from
having highly trained, cohesive teams in peacetime, minimal movement requirements in terms
of stores and vehicles, and small logistical footprints in theatre to reduce sustainment requirements.
In the dynamic environments where today’s infantry battalions can be expected to deploy,
there may not be forward bases to stage into or operate from. Being able to pick up and move
gives the infantry battalion strategic currency. This also relates back to the factor of independent
effectiveness. The nature of the mission may preclude the deployment of heavier and/or
costlier supporting assets. Deployability also implies peacetime structures requiring minimal
augmentation or reorganization for deployment, reducing costly work-up and preparation time.
THE SECTION
Our discussion on the best way to organize today’s infantry must start with the section. Often
viewed as the building block of the infantry battalion, the section has, since its modern
creation, been a small grouping of soldiers commanded by an NCO (corporal or sergeant).
Historically, in the First World War, sections were specialist organizations organized around
specific weapons and designed for trench warfare. Change occurred in the interwar period: a
section became a symmetrical 10‐person organization with an assault group and a support
group built around two Bren guns. Although the section remained at 10 soldiers throughout
the Cold War, with mechanization came the loss of two dismounts to crew the M113, and later
three to crew the LAV, leaving eight and then seven effective ground fighters. With the
introduction of the C7/C9 family of small arms, the section gradually moved away from the
concept of support and assault groups and toward two mutually supporting assault groups
(presumably supported by the weapons in the vehicle).
Is this the best way to organize the section (or squad in U.S. parlance)? How many soldiers are
required to enable the section to optimally conduct fire, movement and other battlefield tasks?
The importance of numbers is related to two factors: controllability and resilience. The U.S.
Army, in the decades between the Second World War and the Vietnam War, conducted and
published numerous significant studies on the infantry squad to determine an optimal
organization. A consistent finding was that if the squad was too small, it would be unable to
withstand battlefield casualties (20%–30% was viewed as the norm) but if it was too large, it
would be too much for one leader to handle effectively (three to five was seen as optimal, but
up to eight was feasible, especially with an assistant). One of the most significant studies, the
1946 Infantry Conference, whose panels featured much of the highly experienced leadership
of the Second World War, determined that a nine-person squad (with an assistant) offered the
optimal balance. 5
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