ARTICLES

guests at a banquet given by the Garrison Club to the officers of the contingent. Both delivered
speeches. Hutton, intoxicated by the spirit of the moment, predicted that Canada would send
50,000 to 100,000 men to defend the empire’s integrity if required. 89 That declaration directly
repudiated the government’s public promise that the 1,000-man contingent constituted no
precedent for the future. Hutton further chastised the government about its continuing efforts
to interfere with the militia, this time with regards to the selection of officers for South Africa.
Borden was incensed and later, drunk, after verbally abusing Hutton, got into a “discreditable”
fracas over the contents of the GOC’s speech with a former militia officer before retiring to bed
“in a helpless state.” 90 The whole messy business made the newspapers. The following evening,
this time at a reception hosted by Minto, Borden again managed to get himself intoxicated and
arrived late to the next day’s review of the contingent. Hutton asked him to address the officers
who were embarking about their pay, a provocative move given that the two had argued on the
issue at the previous evening’s event. Borden replied, recalled Hutton, “in the most offensive
and insolent tone that ... I was always interfering etc, etc.” 91 Believing him drunk once more,
Hutton turned away. 92
Soon aware of events in Quebec, Laurier moved quickly to support Borden against Hutton.
The Prime Minister complained to Minto that Hutton’s remarks were inappropriate and
insubordinate and, moreover, that it was “not in the traditions of the British Army ... [that] ...
soldiers of high or low rank should ever venture into political ground.” 93 Hutton comments of
government policy, Laurier warned, brought him perilously close to breaching “the duties
entrusted to the General Commanding the Militia.” 94 Clearly Laurier was unaware that the
“tradition” in London was, if anything, the reverse. The Prime Minister wrote again the next
day, concerned that the press had picked up Hutton’s remarks about 100,000 Canadian volunteers
and was making it a political issue. 95 By this stage, Hutton was convinced that the tide of
political opinion was actively set against him and that it had been decided, “tacitly or otherwise,
that I must be got rid of,” by making his position uncomfortable to the point of being
intolerable such that he would either resign or perhaps abandon his command for a position
in South Africa. 96
On 2 November 1899, after witnessing the swell of Canadian opinion in support of the first
contingent, and with some early Boer military success stirring the public mood further, Laurier
offered a second contingent to London. The offer was politely refused, however, much to
Hutton’s disappointment, as the gesture to imperial unity had already been made in the initial
contingent and there was as yet no perceived military need for more colonials. 97 By
mid-December, that British position had been dramatically reversed thanks to the deep shock
and humiliation of “Black Week.” 98 In the wake of the crisis, Hutton appealed to the War Office
once more to be allowed to serve in South Africa, but again he was refused. 99 For Hutton and
many across the empire, defeat at the hands of Boer farmers was bad enough, but even worse
was the concern that such a display of British weakness would invite European intervention
and a general war, a prospect no less fearful in the colonies than in Britain. 100 Support for the
war was thus all but sealed in English-speaking Canada, and much French-speaking Canadian
opposition was muted. In general terms, across the empire, lingering cries of opposition grew
quiet. An air of seriousness took hold. In Australia, even the radical and irreverent Bulletin
now declared: “The Empire right or wrong.” 101
40 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016