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Source: Military-Today.com<br />
STK Bronco as an infantry marginal terrain vehicle<br />
awkward fit for infantry rifle companies. It is a large, heavy vehicle and is not designed to be<br />
fought from. As well, with seats for three crew and three passengers, it has minimal space for<br />
dismounts, resulting in a high crew-to-dismount ratio. Except for serving as an armoured bus<br />
for a small number of soldiers, it cannot be practically integrated into the companies and<br />
platoons of the infantry, as it places large demands on battalion maintenance and training and<br />
occupies too many soldiers with crew responsibilities. The Army needs to admit that requirements<br />
were poorly framed and that the TAPV should not be allocated to the infantry battalions.<br />
Rather, many of the vehicles should be assigned to other branches which could more easily<br />
integrate them into existing organizations (the MPs, or perhaps as replacements for the<br />
artillery’s M113 gun line transport), with the remainder placed into a deployment pool of<br />
vehicles for use by specified forces for missions requiring protected mobility.<br />
For operations against a capable threat, the ideal form of protected mobility is a tracked<br />
vehicle capable of operating in all environments, providing a close match to infantry foot<br />
mobility. It should provide sufficient armoured protection and carry large numbers of soldiers.<br />
The British success with the BVS-10 Viking and the STK Bronco in Afghanistan prove these<br />
to be the ideal platforms. They are half the weight of an upgraded LAV and capable of amphibious<br />
and Arctic/winter mobility and moving 10 to 14 passengers. A small number of Vikings<br />
or Broncos would provide outstanding mobility for the infantry battalions if required by the<br />
mission. An armoured carrier squadron, perhaps manned by the armoured corps, could<br />
provide a troop of 14 vehicles to move a rifle company, while a squadron of 50 could move an<br />
entire battalion. These platforms would be of special relevance to the domestic Arctic<br />
sovereignty mission, and the Army should investigate the feasibility of one to two squadrons<br />
to provide the flexibility of allowing any infantry battalion to plug into a highly mobile and<br />
protected battlefield transport organization.<br />
74 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016
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