ARTICLES

After the O Group, Griffin made his way with the battalion to the crossroads in St. Martin while
Harris returned to B Squadron and reported at 0844 hrs that they were ready to advance. 58
Minutes before H‐hour, Megill found Griffin on the forward edge of St. Martin as the
Black Watch began their advance down the road to the Factory area. 59 It was there that Griffin
and Megill allegedly entered into a “heated discussion” between the “hard driving” Brigadier and
the “headstrong” Major concerning the axis of the assault. But this historical canard lacks weight:
when the dust settled, the plan remained unaltered. Salient, however, is the fact that Simonds,
Foulkes and Megill refused to call off the attack or redirect the axis of advance into May-sur-Orne
when they had the chance. Clearly, their collective silence confirmed their sanction of Griffin’s
course of action. But at the very moment when Megill and Griffin were engaged in their tête-àtête,
the ridge was being reinforced by the Germans in preparation for a counterattack that would
have catastrophic consequences for the Black Watch and Simonds’s plan. 60
Just before H‐hour, the Hussars received word from 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade
that their tanks were not to advance as planned into May-sur-Orne until after the Calgary
Highlanders had succeeded in capturing the town. 61 What prompted this decision is unknown,
but it was most likely a reflection of the more experienced Brigade headquarters guiding
Harris, who was fighting his first battle as Squadron commander. 62 More importantly, though,
the evidence suggests that Griffin was unaware of this caveat, as the message originated at
approximately the same time as the Black Watch were deploying in the fields east of the
Factory. 63 There is no record that Harris, or anyone else, attempted to contact Griffin, although
the possibility cannot be ruled out as Harris’s communications were curtailed when a mortar
shell ripped the aerial from his tank while it was still in the orchard area. 64
Even if the attempt had been made early in the assault, radio contact with the forward
companies of the Black Watch and Griffin was lost minutes into the attack, leaving the Black
Watch cut off from radio communication. 65 Most likely, Harris assumed that Griffin had
received word, and there seemed to be reason to at least hope that, despite the young Major’s
order, high command had indeed seen the light and called off the attack. Either way, Harris
and B Squadron remained in a holding pattern in St. Martin as H-hour arrived and the Black
Watch went in. 66
The news of the attack caught Harris “off guard,” according to Black Watch Support Company
commander Capt R.E. Bennett, whose job it was to guard the tank harbour and follow
B Squadron into Fontenay. 67 In Bennett’s estimation, Harris’s tanks “suddenly…started to
move” between “1030 and 1130” which if correct, would be a full 1 to 2 hours behind the Black
Watch. 68 As if to underscore the general confusion of the morning, Bennett managed to catch
up with Harris as his tank rolled out of the orchard in St. Martin and asked him “if the show
was still on?” Harris confirmed that it was, and proceeded to furnish Bennett with the location
of the Black Watch rifle companies, which seemed plausible to Bennett at the time. 69
Harris later claimed that the “sunken and narrow roads” south of St. Martin delayed his advance
by no more than five minutes and that he was never out of visual contact with the infantry. 70
The existing evidence does not support Bennett’s claim that the tanks were “1–2 hours” late,
but neither does it support Harris’s claim that he was “five minutes” late. 71 In fact, the message
20 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016