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<strong>ARTICLES</strong><br />
2/5/39<br />
Pl HQ<br />
Pl Comd (Capt)<br />
Pl Signaller (C-P)<br />
Driver (C-P)<br />
(x2)<br />
Pl CP<br />
Pl 2IC (Lt)<br />
CP NCO (MCpl)<br />
CP Op (C-P)<br />
Sect Comd (Sgt)<br />
2 x Patrol Comd (MCpl)<br />
6 x Patrolmen (C-P)<br />
Sect Comd (Sgt)<br />
2 x Det Comd (MCpl)<br />
6 x Snipers (C-P)<br />
Stores<br />
Pl WO (WO)<br />
Storeman (C-P)<br />
UMS<br />
UMS (WO)<br />
Driver (C-P)<br />
Figure 5: Reconnaissance platoon<br />
Likewise, the recce platoon should transition from four sections of two teams (detachments)<br />
to two sections of three teams (detachments), reducing the patrolman requirement,<br />
streamlining accession within the platoon and improving the ratio of master corporals to<br />
sergeants. When combined with the headquarters, this results in a recce platoon of<br />
46 personnel, far more achievable with the pool of soldiers to draw from while still perfectly<br />
suitable in providing the CO with an ability to find the enemy. Light utility vehicles should be<br />
provided to give the detachments enhanced mobility if required.<br />
While the recce platoon provides the CO with an excellent ability to execute the find function,<br />
the cupboard is bereft of any organic assets to fix the enemy. As already mentioned, the<br />
decision to disband the mortar, pioneer and anti-armour platoons and divest these capabilities<br />
to other arms was a significant loss for the infantry. There was no doctrinal reason to eliminate<br />
these capabilities from the CO’s tool belt; rather, they were discarded by the accountants, cut<br />
after what many viewed as a faulty understanding of complementary versus redundant<br />
capability. In retrospect, considering the value that these combat support capabilities offered<br />
as “force multipliers,” it would have been wiser to assuage the accountant’s axe by cutting away<br />
more basic elements of the battalion, while preserving specialist skill sets. As a consequence,<br />
today the commander of a Force 2013 interim infantry battalion faces an even starker scenario<br />
than the battalion’s company commanders, as the CO simply owns nothing that he or she can<br />
use to support the companies. The lack of organic direct and indirect fire elements at the<br />
WWW.ARMY.FORCES.GC.CA/CAJ 67
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