ARTICLES

ARTICLES
The obvious culprit was Hutton. The Gazette had close ties to him and militia headquarters.
He had the motive and the means. 62 Cabinet members began to wonder, especially after his
confrontation with Scott only a week earlier, if Hutton had taken active steps; if he had not
actually offered Canadian troops to the War Office behind the back of the government, then
at the very least he had used the Gazette to back them further into a corner. 63 Hutton had, of
course, made no such secret offers. The closest he had come were letters to Minto and
Chamberlain in early September telling them that Borden believed that, if war broke out, the
government would despatch troops. 64 On the other hand, although there was no direct or
circumstantial evidence that ever connected Hutton to the article, it is possible that he had a
hand in its instigation. If that was so, it was a daring risk—but one not beyond his character. 65
At the same time, Hutton’s correspondence showed that he was convinced that the government
must soon yield, especially if war was declared. If he was involved with the article, it was a
gamble, in this regard, without much of a purpose. Nonetheless, appearances and passions at
this heated moment in Canadian politics well and truly trumped balanced analysis. Hutton
was in trouble.
From 3 October, ever more serious pressure was applied to Laurier and his government.
Laurier used the Liberal-oriented Globe to deflect the inferences of the Colonial Secretary’s
cable and the Gazette, but that did not stop a large section of the pro-war lobby from interpreting
Chamberlain’s thanks to the “people of Canada” as censure of the lack of government
action. Agitation rose to new heights. 66 On 5 October, Tupper made speeches urging a contingent,
and on the same day news arrived of the official British acceptance of troops from
Queensland and New Zealand. Formal offers had also been made by Jamaica, Trinidad, Malaya,
Hong Kong and Lagos. The New York Tribune reported Canada as “the one important British
colony which makes no offer of martial aid.” 67 According to Hutton, “Anglo-Canada rose like
one man, and the whole press of Upper Canada and the Eastern Provinces, New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia, took up the cudgels.” 68 The Ottawa Citizen ran letters complaining that,
“[a]fter all our protestations of Imperial loyalty, our parliamentary resolutions on the Transvaal
question, and singing of God Save the Queen, the government crawls into its shell and refuses
to do anything.” 69 Representations by militiamen themselves were just as stinging. 70
Laurier was now caught in an inescapable quandary. With the contents of Chamberlain’s cable
open knowledge, private non-official volunteering was no longer a viable alternative. The government
could now reverse its position and raise a contingent, decline to do so in the face of crushing
public opinion, or resign. 71 Pressure continued to mount on Laurier from Chamberlain through
Minto, and from Lord Strathcona, Canada’s High Commissioner in London, who reminded him
on 11 October, the day that war was declared, that the Colonial Office had now accepted contingents
from Western Australia and Tasmania, that the Victorian government had the previous day
voted to send its men, and that similar outcomes were expected at any moment from New South
Wales and South Australia. 72 The Times noted that, if Canada had not yet offered anything, it was
not for want of public opinion but “solely on account of hesitation on part of Government.” 73
By now, with war declared, Laurier’s position was no longer tenable. Hastening back from a
conference in Chicago, the Prime Minister met with his Cabinet. A stormy six-hour meeting
ensued. 74 Tarte and Scott opposed involvement, attacking Chamberlain, Hutton and Minto.
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