ARTICLES

attalion level means that the CO is entirely dependent upon attached enablers to provide the
support to the companies and is completely dependent upon outside organizations to do his
or her job. This does not set a modern infantry battalion up for success.
Sustained direct fire is required to assist in the suppression, neutralization or destruction of
enemy positions and to defeat enemy armoured vehicles. Currently, the CO possesses a single
organic system in the C16 GMG, limited by the relatively small destructive power of the
40‐mm grenade, and no organization formed, manned and equipped to employ it. The 120‐mm
cannon of the Leopard 2 is a very capable system, but tanks may be required in other areas or
may be undeployable due to the theatre. Relying upon a GMG as the sole asset to deal with
hardened positions and armoured vehicles puts Canadian infantry battalions at great risk.
A direct fire support (DFS) platoon needs to be established to provide the CO with organic
heavy weapons capable of providing direct fires with attendant breaching, anti-armour and
anti-personnel effects in the 1,000‐metre to 2,000‐metre zone. Such organizations are deemed
essential and exist in U.S., British and Australian infantry battalions. To provide this capability,
the DFS platoon needs to employ a mix of systems to defeat any ground-based threat to the
rifle companies. For direct fire, a heavy machine gun (for example, the M2A1 50-cal HMG)
serves as a useful baseline weapon system due to its ability to put sustained fire out to an
effective range of 1,800 metres. The DFS platoon would also become the primary employment
organization for the C16 GMG already issued to battalions.
The most critical requirement is for a modern anti-armour system in the form of an anti-tank
guided missile (ATGM). With the divestment of the TOW system, the Canadian infantry is
unable to repel any form of modern armoured vehicle. As recent fighting around the world in
places like Somalia and Syria/Iraq has demonstrated, even irregular opponents can seize and
operate MBTs. The lack of a modern ATGM, such as the Javelin, is a glaring vulnerability for
our infantry and, along with a lightweight mortar, should become a priority procurement
project for concentration in infantry battalion DFS platoons. This would also reduce a
significant demand on the armoured corps, possessing in essence the Army’s only anti-armour
capability with the Leopard 2 MBT, to provide tanks for employment as pillboxes to protect
the infantry. One characteristic of all of these weapon systems is that they can be fired from a
vehicle or from a ground mount. The HMG and GMG are only man-portable for very short
distances, but the ability to dismount them for movement to a nearby fire position is useful.
The DFS platoon would be mounted in a light vehicle and trailer, enabling its sections to
manoeuvre into a fire position to employ its systems in either the vehicle-mounted or
ground-mounted role.
An optimal DFS platoon would have three DFS sections of 12 soldiers in three fire teams, each
fire team mounted in a light utility vehicle. Each DFS section would possess two HMGs and
one GMG, and each fire team would also possess an ATGM guidance post and missiles to
employ against enemy armour or hardened targets. Combined with a small platoon
headquarters with a command vehicle and the platoon 2IC with an echelon primarily for ammo
resupply, the platoon would total 44 soldiers, 10 light utility vehicles and two trucks. The DFS
68 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016