ARTICLES

from the Calgary Highlanders, “it was clear that “there was shit to pay in there.” Letter from Elliot Rodger to the author
Feb 29 1996; LAC Reginald Roy Papers MG30 E374 Vol. 2 Letter from W.J. Megill to Reginald Roy, 22 Nov 1981; Museum
of the Regiments, Interview with Lt Emile Michon Calgary Highlanders, March 1992.
58. LAC RG24 Vol. 14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde: 25 July 0844hrs.
59. Interview with Brigadier W.J. Megill by Terry Copp, January 1988.
60. In addition to elements of the 272nd Infantry Division in positions in and around St. Martin and the south side of
May-sur-Orne, Panzer Grenadiers from II Panzer Division had infiltrated the Factory area while its tactical reserve
(Kampgruppe Sterz) was moving towards May-sur-Orne from reserve positions on the reverse slope of Verrières Ridge.
In addition to the formidable array on their immediate front, the 102nd SS heavy tank battalion, boasting Tiger tanks with
deadly 88‐mm guns, posed a significant threat from the west bank of the Orne. On the opposite flank, machine guns
continued to pepper any movement south of St. Martin, while further back beyond the ridge, two Kampfgruppen from
IX SS Panzer Division were preparing to launch a local counterattack with the support of rockets and artillery from
I SS Panzer Korps. The two battle groups were Kampfgruppe Meyer and Kampfgruppe Zohlhoffer. Jarymowicz, The Quest
for Operational; Jarymowicz “Der Gegangriff Vor Verrières”; Sauer, “Germany’s I SS Panzer Korps: Defensive Operations
June–September 1944”; Reynolds, Steel Inferno.
61. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div.
62. McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars, p.168.
63. Ibid.
64. Powell Interview.
65. For the attack, Griffin had his battalion radio and three FOOs attached to the forward companies for the assault. However,
before the attack could begin, Lt Van Vliet from the 5th Field Rgt developed radio trouble and Griffin gave him permission
to remain in St. Martin until his radio was fixed. By the time it was, the Black Watch wounded were already coming back
and he made a vain attempt to get forward, only to be pinned down in a ditch by the side of the main road for the rest of
the day. The rest of the radios that accompanied the Black Watch up the ridge were all knocked out early in the advance.
Another FOO from the 5th Fd Regt, Capt Gordon Powis, had his knocked out and tried in vain to raise Brigade on the
smaller infantry sets, as Griffin’s battalion set had been knocked out when his jeep was destroyed about 300 yards into the
advance. Another FOO, a Capt from the British 25th Medium Regiment, also had his carrier destroyed early in the assault
and Griffin gave him permission to return to his unit. Powis Report.
66. Bennett Report.
67. Harris Interview; Bennett Report.
68. Bennett Report.
69. Ibid.
70. Harris Interview.
71. Ibid.; Bennett Report.
72. LAC RG 24 Vol. 14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde.
73. Powell Interview.
74. Megill Interview with Terry Copp; PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group TAC HQ Log 25 July.
75. Williamson Letter.
76. Rawson Letter.
77. Powell Interview; McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars, p.168.
78. LAC MG30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers: Vol. 2 Letter from Maj-Gen Megill to Reg Roy. April 16, 1980.
79. MacLauchlan Report.
80. Williamson Letter.
81. Rawson Letter.
82. Harris Interview.
83. Ibid.
84. Powell Interview; Bennett Report.
28 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016