ARTICLES

ARTICLES
43. Harris Report.
44. Bennett Report; Michon Report; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd Bde.
45. All platoon and company commanders were in attendance, along with three artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOOs)
and B Squadron’s commander, Major W.E. Harris. Bennett Report; LAC RG24 Vol.14, 406 Message Log HQ 2nd Cdn Armd
Bde; Stuart, “Notes on Action”; BWA Report on the Battle of St. Andre and May-sur-Orne 25 July 1944 General: This report
is furnished in chronological sequence and is based upon the memories of Major E Motzfeldt (B Coy comd),
Captain J.P.W. Taylor (C Company Comd), Capt JPG Kemp (D Coy Comd), Capt Campbell Stewart (Adjt)
and Lt E.S. Duffield (IO).
46. In addition to his company commanders and platoon commanders, three artillery Forward Observation Officers, and
B Squadron CO, Major Walter Harris attended the meeting. BWA February 26 1945 Report on the Actions of
Major F.P. Griffin 1st Bn The Black Watch (RHR) of Canada. C.A.O. on July 25 1944 by Major J.P.G. Kemp (Black Watch).
47. DHH Outline Report on Battle May-sur-Orne—Fontenay-le-Marmion 25 July 1944 by Brigadier W.J. Megill Commander
5th Cdn Infantry Bde 16 August 1944 According to Megill, Cantlie decided to change the axis of advance after assessing
the situation in St. Martin. However, there is no other evidence to corroborate this version of events.
48. DHH 145.2R15011 (6) Account by Sgt Benson, Scout Pl, RHC of the attack by the Black Watch on May-sur-Orne
25 July 1944 Given to Capt Engler at Basse, 2 Aug 1944; Michon Report According to Lt Emile Michon A/commander of
C Company of the Calgary Highlanders, Griffin ordered him to take his company and clean the Factory area before the
Black Watch went in. While teeing up his company for the attack, he recced the area and concluded that a company backed
by artillery or smoke would be needed to clear the area. Griffin then ordered him to go ahead and secure the start line.
Before that could happen, he was summoned to Calgary Highlander Battalion HQ, where their commander,
Lt-Col MacLauchlan, countermanded the order and told Michon to push on to his original objective, May-sur-Orne. The
other patrol, led by the Black Watch scout sergeant, failed to reach May-sur-Orne due to heavy enemy fire from the village
which occurred when the Black Watch started their assault. Benson Report.
49. DHH Account of the Attack by the Calg Highrs on May-sur-Orne Carried out on 25 Jul 44 as Given by
Lt-Col MacLauchlan, OC at Fleury-sur-Orne 28 Jul 44. In fact, this threat was considered so serious that during the night
the CO of the Calgary Highlanders (Lt-Col D. MacLauchlan) reworked his axis of advance to avoid interference from the
western bank. Instead of sending all four companies down the road to May-sur-Orne, MacLauchlan ordered that one
company move down the original route clearing the right flank as they went, while the other three battalions would swing
east of St. Martin and move through the fields to their objectives in and around May-sur-Orne. Very quickly the three lead
companies making the flanking manoeuvre in the open fields south of St. Martin ran into German machine gun fire from
the ridge and from the Factory area, where heavy casualties ensued. One company managed to get loose from the fire but,
after a series of map-reading blunders, ended up advancing on St. Martin again after thinking they had overshot their
objective. This company, under the command of a platoon leader, had the church in May-sur-Orne as its objective but, as
first light was breaking, it arrived in the churchyard at St. Martin as the lead elements of the Black Watch were also arriving.
According to Lt Emile Michon, who commanded the company, he had no idea of his map-reading error until the rest
of the Black Watch battalion showed up around the church in St. Martin. Michon Report.
50. Griffin’s decision was due to the fact that both neutralizing fire by the British 12th Corps and a smokescreen created by
2nd Canadian Division proved ineffective, leaving the western approach to Verrières in full view of German positions on
the heights west of the Orne river. LAC RG 24 Vol.13, 750 WD 2nd Canadian Infantry Division Operational Order No 1
July 24 1944.
51. Megill Report.
52. Powell Interview; Harris Interview.
53. Interview of Brig Megill by Terry Copp. January 1988.
54. LAC RG24 Vol. 12745 Letter from William Rawson to Lt. Col. G.F.P. Stanley Historical Section January 24 1945.
55. Powis Report; Doug Amaron, History of the 1st Battalion in WW II (Unpublished manuscript 1946) Author’s Collection;
Benson Report.
56. Powis Report; Amaron, History of the 1st Battalion in WW II This is likely the reason why so many of the Black Watch who
survived the assault reported after the war that artillery support had been non-existent. In contrast to what they had seen
in training and in their earlier, albeit brief, experiences in Normandy, the concentrations on distant targets were unlikely
to be seen, let alone heard, in the heat of battle as they plunged down the reverse slope of the ridge.
57. Ibid. According to Simonds’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Elliot Rodger, the situation leading up to SPRING was both “serious”
and “urgent,” while Brigadier Megill later confided that “we would have been ordered to continue attacking as long as
troops could be persuaded to make the effort!” To the average young platoon commander in the front, like Lt Emile Michon
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