ARTICLES

ARTICLES
Black Watch wounded came back with stories that made the assault appear to be “an absolute
massacre.” 93 With every officer but one in B Squadron a casualty, Powell’s remaining tanks,
along with the survivors of the Black Watch and Calgary Highlanders, pulled back to the
northern part of St. Martin. 94 During their withdrawal, a final irony occurred when RAF
Typhoons, mistaking the First Hussars’ tanks for German ones, knocked out one with rocket
and cannon fire, leaving the survivors somewhat resentful about the day’s actions. 95
It is quite clear that the attack up Verrières Ridge was a daunting feat to begin with, as Simonds’s
command style, his time-dependent plan and his propensity to gamble came together to form
the context into which the Black Watch and B Squadron were thrust on the morning of
25 July 1944. 96 Seven decades later, it is understandable that the average frontline soldier, whose
war in many cases was “fifty yards wide and fifty yards deep,” would not grasp the complexity
of an operation such as SPRING—particularly when his focus on the day was the job at hand
and, as the battle progressed, mere survival. In addition, after assessing the evidence there is
no need to wonder where the armour was; rather, we should ask whether its inclusion would
have made the difference between success and failure for the Black Watch.
Some observers continue to believe it would have, while others disagree. The former opinion
is centred on the fact that, a few days earlier, the Black Watch had successfully attacked the area
near the village of Ifs with support from the Hussars and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. 97 Yet on that
day their opponents consisted of a mixture of rear guards and advanced outposts with limited
anti-tank and armoured support, and low to non-existent morale. On 25 July, however, they
tackled a prepared German Main Line of Resistance on ground that afforded the defenders
excellent observation and superior fields of fire—particularly in broad daylight—backed up
with a conservative estimate of roughly 100 panzers and an equal number of anti-tank guns
either in reverse slope positions or on the heights west of the Orne river. 98 Having the
B Squadron tanks move into May-sur-Orne as the Black Watch advanced up the open slopes
was no guarantee of success either. In fact, as was later learned, elements of the 272nd Infantry
Division, holding the southern portion of May-sur-Orne, exercised strict fire discipline and
gave unseasoned troops the impression that the village was not held on a continuous basis
when in fact it was. 99 Even if the tanks had managed to penetrate to the village’s eastern edge
as planned, they would have met the brunt of a German panzer counterattack that was forming
up south of the town. Any support that B Squadron could have offered the Black Watch would
have been forfeited in an effort to fend off the counterthrust. Although they would undoubtedly
have drawn some of the fire away from the Black Watch, the infantry would have been left
without direct fire support just when it needed it the most, as the artillery dissipated on its
descent into Fontenay. Equally, it is highly unlikely that Major Harris’s proposed rush to the
gap between the ridge and May-sur-Orne would have been a success. With the Germans’
defences strengthening on an hourly basis, coupled with their skilful use of the reverse slope,
technological superiority in arms and armament, and a commanding view of the ridge from
three sides, it is more than likely that B Squadron would have been engulfed in the same
maelström and ultimately shared the same cruel fate as the Black Watch. 100
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