ARTICLES

30. Bennett Report; Interview with Capt George Buch by the author, January 1993; LAC Personnel File of Major F.P. Griffin
Final Report of the No 4 Wing CTS Infantry Company Commanders Tactical Course. In his concluding remarks on the
May 1943 course, the commander of No. 4 Wing wrote this of Griffin: “Expresses himself very well and clearly in speech
and writing. Learns quickly; quick at grasping new ideas. Instructions and persevering. Polite, conscientious in fulfilling
obligations, helpful and considerate of others and generally liked. Has an equable and well-balanced temperament. Has a
very good knowledge of the inf and a good knowledge of other arms and gets well in the tactical picture. His tactical and
adm appreciations and decisions are always sound. Confident, shows initiative and readily inspires confidence. Has good
powers of Command. Responsible, conscientious and reliable. After more experience as a coy commander this officer
would probably be suitable for appt as 2IC of a battalion. Recommend for appt as an instructor of the Coy Commands
Course.” By the time Griffin attended this course in May 1943 he had held positions as platoon commander, IO, LO,
Company 2IC and Company Commander. At the time this was written he was only 25 years of age.
31. Harris Interview; DHH 92/252 Message from CMHQ to DHS Jan 11 1946; DHH Account of the Attack by the
Calgary Highlanders on May-sur-Orne Night 24/25 July 1944. Given by Capt Harrison, D Coy, to Capt Engler at Basse,
29 July 1944.
32. Stuart, “Notes on Action”; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report; Bennett Report.
33. LAC RG24 Vol.14, 109 Message Log HQ 5th Cdn Inf Bde. According to the message log of 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade,
at 0645 Foulkes ordered the Calgary Highlanders not to dig in but instead “go wide and keep going.” Two minutes later,
Brigadier Megill told the RHC to “push on” as “speed was essential” and half an hour later, at 0715, Megill issued a direct
order to Griffin to “go ahead.” In 1992, Campbell Stuart (the Black Watch Adjutant responsible for the radio link between
higher command and Griffin) wrote, “I found myself receiving messages from Brigade to pass on to Major Griffin, demanding
an immediate attack and replies from Griffin to pass back to Brigade explaining the situation, emphasizing the lack of
Calgary success and stressing the foolhardiness of pressing an attack.” According to CQMS Ritchie of the Black Watch,
who worked under Cantlie, Griffin sent a “lengthy message” to the effect that St. Andre was heavily garrisoned, supporting
troops could not be found, and the front was strongly held by enemy armour, artillery and infantry. Griffin asked for
instructions, and the Brigade’s reply was to “go ahead as originally ordered.” This evidence is corroborated by
Capt G.D. Powis, the artillery FOO attached to the Black Watch, who reported in an interview a year later that after
Griffin sent his message the response was simply to “push on.” Stuart, “Notes on Action”; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report;
Bennett Report.
34. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13, 750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div.
35. Stuart, “Notes on Action”; Ritchie Interview; Powis Report.
36. DHH 92/252 Account of the Attack by the Calgary Highlanders on May-sur-Orne during the night of 24/25 July 1944.
Given by Lt E.A. Michon, D Coy to Capt Engler at Basse, 29 July 1944.
37. Bennett Report.
38. LAC RG24 Vol. 10, 808 Notes from Corps Commander’s O Group 1000 hrs 23 July 1944.
39. PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group TAC HQ Log 25 July: TOR 0750hrs from Second Army: 2nd Cdn Div. 5th Cdn Bde
one Coy in May-sur-Orne. Mopping up continues in St. Martin. One Bn by-passed May-sur-Orne and moving on Fontenay.
4th Cdn Bde—one bn just south of Verrières, one bn just north of the village; bn by-passed town and going on to
Rocquancourt. 3rd Cdn Div—9th Cdn bde still mopping up Tilly-la-Campagne. 7th Armd Div. 22 Armd bde with two
regts up met enemy tanks 0360. Four enemy tanks brewed up: others withdrawing.; PRO WO171/112 21st Army Group
TAC HQ Log 25 July: “1025hrs from Second Army: RHC of 5th Cdn Bde started moving towards Fontenay by passing
May-sur-Orne at 0830hrs. Royal Regt of C of 4th Cdn Inf Bde making slow progress South of Verrières in face of hy
mortar fire. 7th Armd Div engaging enemy inf at 035595. Gds Armd Div now at 2 hrs notice to move. Corps Comd will
decide by 1200hrs whether Gds Armd Div will be employed today.”
40. LAC MG30 E374 Reginald Roy Papers: Vol. 2 Letter from Bob Moncel [Simonds’s Operations OFFICER] to Reg Roy.
May 18, 1981.
41. Unknown to the Black Watch and the Hussars, units of the veteran 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, engaged with the elite
I SS Panzer Division at Tilly-la-Campagne, balked at Simonds’s orders to bypass, refusing to carry out what seemed to be
a “hopeless action.” However, in Foulkes’s division, which was fighting its first major engagement since Dieppe, there is
no record of any outright refusal to conform to Simonds’s orders.
42. LAC RG 24 Vol. 13,750 Message Log Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div: “July 25 0823hrs serial 2222 from 5th Cdn Inf Bde to RHC:
Intercept—Fetch Sunray—I must see Sunray at once have your wireless comn with him. Can you relay a message for us?
Understand the reason you are being held up is because of 3 MGs near burnt out tanks, have plastered them. It is essential
you get on immediately. Suggest you take them on with your own guns. (Passed to Command post).”
26 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016