ARTICLES

ARTICLES
7. Have the infantry corps formally initiate the force development process to create direct
fire support platoons for each battalion. This will require 396 PYs and the procurement
of a heavy machine gun and an ATGM system.
8. Have the infantry corps work with the armoured corps to develop the armoured
carrier squadron concept. One to two of these sub-units, each consisting of about
50 Marginal Terrain Vehicles (MTVs) broken into a headquarters and troops of
14 MTVs, would be capable of providing an IB with protected, armed mobility in any
terrain, including the Arctic and mountainous, winter or amphibious terrain. The
MTV, armoured and armed, would become the primary protected mobility vehicle
for the IBs for combat operations as well as offering true mobility in the Arctic. The
TAPV, unsuitable for infantry service except when assigned from a mission-specific
pool, should see a majority of the vehicles currently planned for the infantry assigned
to another area of the Army where they can be more suitably employed.
9. Have the infantry and armoured corps investigate potential DFS solutions for the
MIBs, to include LAV hulls with ATGM or cannon turrets to meet the expanded
manoeuvre and weapons ranges of the MIBs, providing the Army with an alternative
DFS platform that can complement the Leopard 2 MBT through greater deployability.
Recommendations 1 through 4 are possible with the resources and manpower available today
(except the new lightweight mortar) and should be pursued as soon as possible to improve the
capabilities of the existing infantry battalions. Proposals 5 and 6 demand some redesign of
currently existing TPs and vehicles. Proposals 7 through 9 require FD efforts and investments
of resources and PYs, but this article has provided firm analysis for doctrinal requirements to
support these programs as viable projects for future capability development.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the current Force 2013 interim infantry battalion establishment and
found it unfit for the task. It has provided an alternative proposal for organization based on
infantry battalions and mechanized infantry battalions. For zero PY growth, minimal resource
reallocation, and better integration of reservists, the Army can adopt the proposed battalions
featuring company direct and indirect fire capabilities, the return of battalion mortar platoons,
and standardized rifle platoons with no manning shortfalls. These will be more cohesive
organizations and are better able to train and deploy with minimal augmentation. These are
not radical new organizations and are similar to what our allies currently field.
In the end, adoption of these recommendations will create well-rounded, flexible infantry
battalions for the Army. These battalions are effective with organic assets within their
manoeuvre envelopes, are flexible in organization and are deployable with far less
augmentation than the current Force 2013 interim battalions. The infantry battalion has,
throughout the last century, been organized to reflect not only the tactical requirements of the
time but also the economic realities of the garrison army. The proposals here recognize the
former while creating the best possible organization to address the latter.
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