ARTICLES

Source: Library and Archives Canada
continue what Operation GOODWOOD and its Canadian adjunct Operation ATLANTIC
failed to accomplish: a clean “break-in” and “breakthrough” of the nascent German positions
on the Verrières–Bourguebus ridge. What ATLANTIC did achieve was an unexpected turn of
the German line on the western edge along the banks of the Orne River, and Simonds hoped
to exploit it by effecting a “break-in” and “breakthrough” in phases I and II, followed by a
“breakout” in phase III and exploitation to Falaise in phase IV.
Before the ink dried on his first draft, however, inclement weather and the disappointing
performance of Major-General Charles Foulkes’s 2nd Canadian Infantry Division during
ATLANTIC postponed the operation for a crucial 48 hours. During those two days,
intelligence sources revealed the start of a significant thickening of the German line that placed
the overall success of his ambitious plan in doubt. 5 Faced with the incremental build-up of
sizeable panzer reserves within striking distance of the ridge, Simonds changed the
complexion of SPRING.
By 21 July, he had concluded that Falaise was no longer in reach, but he believed that the ridge
itself, and the tactically enticing Cramesnil Spur to the south, remained firmly in view. In
consultation with Dempsey, Simonds reshaped SPRING along the lines of the Second Army
commander’s “Tennis Over the Orne” concept: instead of embarking on a clean break-in,
breakthrough and breakout to Falaise, Simonds tore a page from Arthur Currie’s playbook at
Hill 70 in 1917 and adopted a “bite and hold” approach to lure his German counterpart,
I SS Panzer Korp commander General Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, into a costly and potentially
decisive battle of attrition. 6 The unhinging of the German defences at this point, coupled with
imperilling the I SS Panzer Division by grabbing the ridge and the Spur, formed the
required bait.
12 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016