ARTICLES

FANGS OF THE LONE WOLF:
Chechen Tactics in the Russian–Chechen
Wars, 1994–2009
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
BILLINGSLEY, Dodge. Solihull, UK: Helion Publishing, 2013, hardcover,
181 pages, $52.29, Photos/Maps: 11/30, ISBN 978-1-909384-77-4
Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham, CD, Air Logistics Transport Officer,
A5, 1st Canadian Air Division.
Between 1994 and 2009 the Russian Federation
and the Chechen fighters fought two distinct wars
over the question of independence for Chechnya.
These wars were interesting in that, although both
were fought between the same adversaries, the
nature, doctrine and skill sets evident in each conflict
were unique and gave each conflict a very individual
character. The author, an experienced conflict reporter,
was embedded regionally during the fighting and was
able to interview a number of Chechen combatants
about how they planned and executed operations.
One of the most evident and consistent conclusions drawn by the author was that critical
limitations were imposed upon the Chechens by their lack of a coherent or reliable logistics
system. Throughout both wars they were utterly unable to hold territory for any length of time
due to their inability to resupply and maintain their forces. Thus, during the initial fighting in
1994–1995, although Chechen forces had artillery, tanks and other advanced weapon systems,
they quickly became ineffective due to a lack of munitions, spares and recovery capabilities.
The Chechens were also hampered by their ad hoc fighting and command and control
structures. Units were formed around individuals from the same town or village and were loyal
only to their elected leaders. They would frequently depart a battlefield for personal or clan
reasons without notifying their central command. Orders from the centre were extremely
general, often only outlining roughly where units were to deploy. Individual unit leaders would
then determine tactics and plans without consulting neighbouring sections. This often resulted
in fractured responses and a lack of confidence in other units’ reliability.
Nevertheless, as the author relates, the Chechens were not lacking in courage or tactical
capability. Employing advanced defensive techniques, they were regularly able to counter
Russian offensive doctrine and inflict significant damage upon armour and air assets. They
were also able to take advantage of local support to obtain food, shelter and information,
depending upon the region where they were operating. This changed as the second war dragged
on: local sources of support were sapped as the civilian population grew tired of the conflict,
and the Russians succeeded in promoting intense conflict between Chechen groups.
134 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016