ARTICLES

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...
Professor David R. O’Keefe is an award-winning historian, a professor, a documentarian and
a best-selling author. He studied at Concordia and McGill Universities in Montreal before
attending the University of Ottawa, where he earned his M.A. and PhD in History. He has
taught Modern and Military History at the College level in Montreal.
He served as an infantry officer in The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) in
Montreal and was later employed as their historian for close to a decade.
In addition, he worked as a specialist in Signals Intelligence history for the Department of
National Defence and conducted research for the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy
in the Second World War.
O’Keefe’s book on Dieppe, One Day in August: The Unknown Story behind Canada’s Tragedy at
Dieppe, was both a bestseller and a finalist for several prestigious literary awards, including the
RBC Taylor Prize, the J.W. Dafoe Book Prize, and the Canadian Authors Association Lela
Common Award for Canadian History. In 2012, he was awarded the Diamond Jubilee Medal
by the Minister of Veteran’s Affairs for his service to Canada in conducting historical research
for his work on Dieppe.
ENDNOTES
1. The controversy surrounding SPRING stemmed from Simonds’s claims that it was not intended as a breakthrough operation
but rather as a sacrificial holding attack designed to aid the Americans in the western end of the bridgehead. The
truth was that SPRING was neither. In fact, Simonds originally envisioned the operation as a breakout to cap off what
Operation GOODWOOD had failed to accomplish days earlier. Heavy rains and strong German counterattacks in the
days leading up to SPRING vastly changed the nature and scope of the operation, as it was clear to Simonds that the
prospects for a sweeping breakout had evaporated by 23 July. By that date, it was clear that his corps faced the prospect of
fighting a battle of attrition in efforts to wear down German reserves on the reverse slope of the ridge, in preparation for
another breakout blow to follow in early August. The idea of a holding attack originated with Montgomery the day after
SPRING was called off. On that day, Montgomery ordered Simonds to consolidate his position and “attract” German
panzers in an effort to keep them from moving west in the path of the American Army surging south from St. Lo.
2. Library and Archives Canada (hereinafter LAC) RG24 Vol. 10, 808. In 1945 the Army Historical Section under C.P. Stacey
interviewed 31 Black Watch survivors from Verrières Ridge who all reported receiving neither artillery nor tank support
during their attack.
3. Reginald Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1984); Terry Copp, The Brigade: The 5th Canadian
Infantry Brigade 1939–1945 (Stoney Creek, ON: Fortress Publications, 1992); David Bercuson, Battalion of Heroes: The
Calgary Highlanders at War 1939–1945 (Calgary: Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Association, 1994); C.P. Stacey,
Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III: The Victory Campaign (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer,
1960); J.A. English, Canadian Army in Normandy: Failure in High Command (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
4. In addition to the units listed above, Simonds had the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade along with usual corps and
divisional artillery allotment and one AGRA. In the air, he could call upon support from the medium and typhoon aircraft
from the RAF’s 2nd Tactical Air Force.
5. ULTRA was the colloquial term used to denote intelligence derived from the breaking of high-level enemy codes
and ciphers.
6. PRO, CAB106/1061, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart Notes Made By Captain Liddell-Hart on his 21/2/1952 Interview with
General M.C. Dempsey. Operation “GOODWOOD” 18 July 1944. “By striking first on one side of the Orne and then on
the other,” Dempsey told Liddell-Hart ,”we should force him to bring divisions across, and be able to hit them with our air
24 THE CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL VOLUME 16.2 2016