ARTICLES

ARTICLES
9. See pp. 1-14 to 1-19 of US Army FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad and the first chapter of USMC MCWP
3-11.2 Marine Rifle Squad.
10. See p. 44 of Jim Storr, “Exercise SEA WALL: Infantry Tactics in an Era of Manoeuvre Warfare” in The British Army Review,
No. 119 (August 1998), pp. 38–46.
11. The question remains: should we move to adopt the U.S. model of having a section commander independent of the fire
teams? Relieving a section commander of the duty of commanding his or her own fire team and simply commanding
two others is a useful concept. However, this demands additional personnel and leadership-qualified personnel; for the sake
of the argument, this proposal will mirror the Australian model and put the section commander in one of the fire teams.
12. For poor suppressive performance of the Minimi LMG, see p. 46 of Jim Storr, “The Real Role of Small Arms in Combat”
in RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009), pp. 44–46. On the value of higher rates of high explosive fire for suppressive
effects, see Storr, “High Explosive.” Also see Melody, The Infantry Rifle Squad, pp. 27–28, for a discussion of the balance
between firepower and riflemen and the observed problem of having too many unique weapons and not enough basic
riflemen. Melody argued that a single LMG and grenade launcher was sufficient for a squad and that performance
deteriorated with the addition of more of these weapons.
13. A good synopsis of infantry small unit manoeuvre is provided by David Kilcullen, “Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close
Combat” in Australian Army Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003), pp. 29–40. Also see operational analysis with Dean K. Bowley,
Taryn D. Castles and Alex Ryan, Attrition and Suppression: Defining the Nature of Close Combat (Edinburgh, South
Australia: DSTO Information Sciences Library, 2004).
14. To put the training cost into perspective, in accordance with published training plans, it takes 32 days to produce a recce
patrolman and 92 days for an advanced patrolman (section or platoon leadership). Likewise, it takes 80 training days to
produce a basic sniper (Basic Recce and Basic Sniper course), an additional 32 days for a sniper detachment commander
and an additional 25 for a unit master sniper. Although these courses produce world-class specialists, their opportunity
costs need to be considered and balanced with the battalion’s requirements.
15. For a good summary of the move from the eight- to four-company battalion, see I.F. Maxse, “Battalion Organization” in
The Royal United Services Institution Journal, Vol. 56, No. 407 (1912), pp. 53–86. Not all were convinced; see R.J. Kentish,
“The Case for the Eight Company Battalion” in The Royal United Services Institution Journal. Vol. 56, No. 413 (1912),
pp. 891–928.
16. For excellent analysis on staff and headquarters, see Jim Storr, The Command of Land Forces in Iraq, March–May 2003
(Wiltshire, UK: British Army Directorate General of Doctrine and Development, 2003). See also Jim Storr, “Real People,
Real Decisions: Designing HQs to Win Wars” in The British Army Review, No. 123 (Winter 1999/2000), and
Dermot Rooney, “Can We Make Headquarters Simpler” in The British Army Review, No. 142 (Summer 2007).
17. Simon Parker, “Deploying Without an Administration Company—TF 3/06 BG Echelon System During Operation Medusa”
in The Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2007), pp. 36–48.
18. Alex D. Haynes, “The Force Employment Concept and the Infantry: A Proposal” in The Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (2006), pp. 37–47.
19. The issue is related to the fact that light armoured vehicles, whether APC or IFV, are not as heavily armoured as tanks and
can be defeated by many different enemy systems. Driving up to an objective entails significant risk to the infantry in the
back of a vehicle, and as an OCT the author witnessed many instances of entire sections destroyed because of
overconfidence in the protection of a vehicle and a reluctance to dismount. For more on this, see William F. Owen, “Wrong
Technology for the Wrong Tactics: The Infantry Fighting Vehicle” in Military Operations, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2012), pp. 17–20.
20. See Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2014), pp. 32–36.
21. Together, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have 36 combined arms battalions (permanent tank/mechanized infantry
units) and 24 Stryker infantry battalions compared to 42 light role and 24 Marine battalions. The British Army is moving
to a force composition of 6 armoured infantry (Warrior IFV) and 3 heavy protected mobility battalions compared to 8 light
protected mobility battalions, 14 light role battalions and 3 RM commandos. The Australian Infantry has 7 standardized
infantry battalions in the light role, with the armoured cavalry regiments in each brigade being able to transport up to
3 battalions in total.
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