ARTICLES

ARTICLES
platoon could be employed by the CO as a concentrated platoon to mass direct fires on targets
to support the battalion’s main effort, or sections could be assigned to companies, pushing
enhanced direct fire capability down to the company commanders to support their manoeuvre.
DFS
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DFS
PlHQ
Pl Comd (Capt)
Pl 2IC (WO)
Stores NCO (MCpl)
Pl Signaller (C-P)
Weapon Op (C-P)
3 x Driver (C-P)
Sect Comd (Sgt)
2 x Team Comd (MCpl)
3 x Weapon Op (C-P)
3 x Ammo Bearer (C-P)
3 x Driver (C-P)
Figure 6: Direct fire support platoon
Indirect fire for the battalion is usually a mix of cannon and mortar fire. Since the elimination
of the mortar platoons, all indirect fires have been the responsibility of the artillery regiments,
with the 81‐mm medium mortars being moved to these units. However, due to their own
manning issues and the imperative to man the sterling M777, the mortars are only manned as
an alternative to the howitzer. Due to the either/or employment concept of medium mortars
in the artillery regiments and the primacy of the howitzer, the medium mortar is effectively
lost as a capability to the Army. There is no ability to mass mortar and cannon fires, as the
employment of mortars means the howitzers are offline. This either/or concept also means that
the siting of the howitzers will take priority and that the fire position will likely not be in a
location for optimal mortar employment. Finally, like the company commander, the infantry
CO is denied the ability to utilize the non-lethal effects of smoke and illumination, forcing the
artillery to provide these in situations even when use of M777 munitions may overmatch the
mission requirements. Although there were numerous factors in moving the capability to the
artillery, none were militarily sound, and anecdotal evidence this author has seen suggests that
many members of both the infantry and the artillery would be happy to see the medium
mortar returned to the infantry.
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