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AFRICA AGRICULTURE STATUS REPORT 2016

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expenditure (research, extension, irrigation,<br />

marketing, infrastructure, farm support<br />

subsidies) and growth and other development<br />

outcomes is summarized in Table 2.2 (for<br />

detailed discussion,see Benin 2015a, 2015b).<br />

It shows that different types of agriculture<br />

expenditure are positively and significantly<br />

related to agricultural growth and many other<br />

development outcomes.<br />

However, it is difficult to identify and prioritize highimpact<br />

components of agricultural expenditures<br />

in a comprehensive and consistent manner. This<br />

is because the underlying studies vary in many<br />

aspects (including methodology, country and<br />

time-series coverage, and level and measure of<br />

expenditure and impact indicators), which limits<br />

their comparability for ranking different types of<br />

expenditures, and for understanding how the<br />

impacts have evolved over time.<br />

A study by Fan, Gulati and Thorat (2008) in<br />

India provides an example of the nature of<br />

evidence that is extremely useful for prioritizing<br />

investments. In that study, they estimate the<br />

returns in terms of agricultural GDP and poverty<br />

reduction to public expenditure in agricultural<br />

R&D, irrigation, and fertilizer and credit subsidies<br />

as well as expenditure on rural roads, education,<br />

and power. The returns are estimated for different<br />

periods of time, 1960s-1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.<br />

The results thus offer a rich comparative analysis<br />

of temporal returns to expenditure within and<br />

across agricultural and non-agricultural sectors,<br />

with the inter-temporal differences suggesting<br />

a shift in priorities over time. For example,<br />

expenditure on roads, education, and R&D have<br />

the largest returns, whereas expenditure on<br />

fertilizer and power subsidies have the lowest<br />

returns; subsidies on credit outperform subsidies<br />

on irrigation, fertilizer and power. Subsidies on<br />

credit are among the top two or three highest<br />

ranked within the agriculture expenditure<br />

portfolio, suggesting that some forms of subsidies<br />

are indeed favorable.<br />

Effect of CAADP on Agricultural Spending,<br />

Growth, and Other Outcomes<br />

How has CAADP contributed to the above trends<br />

and performance in the different indicators?<br />

Answering this question fully is beyond the<br />

scope of this paper. Preliminary results of<br />

ongoing analysis to address this question show<br />

that CAADP has made significant contributions<br />

to the achievements described above (Benin,<br />

<strong>2016</strong>). In this section, we use analysis of means<br />

and variances in several of the above indicators<br />

across different groups of countries categorized<br />

according to two definitions of CAADP<br />

implementation: (1) three groups of countries<br />

depending on when they signed their CAADP<br />

compact, whether in 2007–2009, 2010–2012,<br />

or 2013–2014, as opposed to those that had not<br />

signed a compact by the end of 2014; and (2)<br />

five groups of countries depending on the level<br />

of implementation reached by 2014, those yet to<br />

start or at the pre-compact stage—level 0, those<br />

that have a compact only—level 1, those that<br />

have a NAIP but have not secured any external<br />

funding—level 2, those that have a NAIP and have<br />

secured external funding from one source only—<br />

level 3, and those that have secured external<br />

funding from more than one source—level 4<br />

(see Table 2.3) 3 . This method is a simplified<br />

difference-in-difference approach in which the<br />

basic result is interpreted as the percentage<br />

change in the outcome in countries that are<br />

implementing CAADP compared to the general<br />

change in the outcome in countries that are not<br />

implementing CAADP. For countries that are<br />

implementing CAADP, the result is differentiated<br />

and interpreted as the relative effect of signing<br />

a compact in the different periods or reaching<br />

different levels of implementation 4 . Because<br />

the implementation of CAADP involves several<br />

processes that take time to be institutionalized,<br />

whose effect in turn take time to materialize, we<br />

expect the effect of CAADP to be larger for those<br />

that signed their compact earlier than later and,<br />

similarly, for those that have reached higher than<br />

lower levels of implementation.<br />

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the average annual<br />

percentage change in the value of different<br />

indicators over the 2003–2014 period and the<br />

two nested sub-periods of 2003–2008 and 2008–<br />

2014. We observe several patterns, but highlight<br />

two major ones. First, the changes are generally<br />

larger for countries that are implementing<br />

CAADP than for those that are not, which is<br />

consistent across the two definitions of CAADP<br />

implementation and measurement periods.<br />

More importantly, the differences are statistically<br />

significant, especially when comparing changes<br />

for countries that signed their compact in<br />

2007–2009 versus changes for countries that<br />

have not signed (Table 2.4), and for those that<br />

3<br />

The analysis is<br />

based on Benin<br />

(<strong>2016</strong>), which<br />

uses data on 46<br />

countries that<br />

have adequate<br />

time-series data on<br />

all the indicators<br />

analyzed. The<br />

excluded countries<br />

are the Comoros,<br />

Equatorial Guinea,<br />

Gabon, Libya, São<br />

Tomé and Principe,<br />

Seychelles,<br />

Somalia, and<br />

South Sudan.<br />

There are three<br />

external funding<br />

sources used<br />

here—New Alliance<br />

Cooperation, Grow<br />

Africa, and GAFSP.<br />

4<br />

Because the effect<br />

of CAADP on the<br />

various outcomes<br />

is manifested<br />

via multiple<br />

pathways—see<br />

CAADP Monitoring<br />

and Evaluation and<br />

Results Framework<br />

(AU-NEPAD, 2015;<br />

Benin, Johnson, &<br />

Omilola, 2010)—it<br />

is important not<br />

to control for<br />

any intermediate<br />

transformations,<br />

outcomes, or<br />

processes that<br />

are influenced by<br />

CAADP to get a<br />

reliable estimate of<br />

the total effect, i.e.,<br />

direct and indirect<br />

effect. Factors that<br />

affect a country’s<br />

decision to<br />

implement CAADP<br />

as well as the<br />

outcomes must be<br />

controlled for, which<br />

is not done here<br />

(see Benin, <strong>2016</strong>).<br />

34 <strong>AFRICA</strong> <strong>AGRICULTURE</strong> <strong>STATUS</strong> <strong>REPORT</strong> <strong>2016</strong>

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