French orders to foreign shipyards

Recommendations

Info

14 Destination Gotland, fast ferry, blt 1999 by Alstom Leroux Naval, owned by Rederi AB Gotland. Slowing of growth in Europe at the end of 1998 into early 1999, which was linked to poor economic prospects and low freight rates, directly impacted the less speculative specialised vessels market upon which European shipyards are positioned. Orders for vessels considered strategic from European shipyards, such as ro-ros and ferries, were taken by China and Korea, and cruiseships were ordered from Japan by European shipowners. Large offshore projects also either slipped through their fingers, or were postponed or cancelled following the drop in oil prices in 1998 and restructuring occurring in the oil industry. The April 1999 decision taken by the Kvaerner Group to abandon shipbuilding because of disastrous results was a shock. This group stood out in the nineties for its unusual dynamism, transcending national borders through investments in Great Britain, Finland, Germany and the US. Kvaerner’s withdrawal seems like a confirmation of the failure of shipbuilding in Europe. The president of Kvaerner set a deadline to accomplish the company’s exit. For the moment, only two shipyards of thirteen have been sold out, and an agreement has been reached for a third one. It is probable that the shipyards in Great Britain, Germany, Finland and the US will be taken over by national interests, given the stakes involved. It is also probable that the smallest among them could resign themselves to close. All shipyards are dreading the time when they will have to take orders without subsidies, after 2001. It is possible that they will collapse under this new pressure, while Asian yards could begin to seek niches in Europe following their take-over of the standard vessel construction market. It is already being said that Europe would witness the forced disappearance of shipbuilding, following the same path as the US when subsidies ceased in the mid-eighties. The Association of West European Shipbuilders (AWES) has continued to protest against Korean shipyards since the beginning of the Asian crisis for unfair competition. AWES claim that, with the help of the IMF, these yards were able to stay in business despite crippling debt. Meanwhile, in Europe, shipbuilders were forced to close their doors or reduce capacity in exchange for subsidies. Some of these include Aahrus in Denmark, YVC Ysselwerf in the Netherlands (shipbuilding and repair activities will nonetheless be retained later) and Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre in France.
10 9.5 9 8.5 8 7.5 7 The European Commission has drawn up a production cost report claiming that Korea is guilty of dumping. Furthermore, Japan may join Europe in lodging a complaint before the WTO following the state-owned Korean Development Bank’s financing of the Daewoo shipyard. For the moment, the outcome of all this has yet to be determined. Korean shipbuilders insist that their success is indeed partly due to the won’s devaluation, but mostly because of sacrifices by labour and management, who have put in longer hours and accepted large salary cuts in order to increase productivity. They add that the main objective of European shipbuilders in this quarrel is to extend subsidies past 2001. Subsidies continue to divide the European partners, some of them support this solution because they consider it as necessary support while others view it as a way to distort competition. The introduction of the euro will halt internal currency movements that could lead to temporary and artificial improvements in competitiveness. European shipyards can only hope that the market will naturally reduce over-capacity, making States support less imperative and allowing shipbuilders thus to achieve autonomy. France Million gt 1990 West European orderbook (average quarterly volume of orders) and market share 1991 1992 In France, shipbuilding is going through an exceptional period, with the orderbook rising from 480,000 gt to 749,000 gt in one year. In September 1997, it was at only 293,000 gt. This unique performance is due to the Chantiers de l’Atlantique management strategy of separating itself entirely from shipbuilding subsidies between now and 2001. To achieve this goal, a drastic reduction of costs has been put into effect, accomplished through a complete 1993 1994 1995 Orderbook Market share 1996 1997 Sep 98 Dec 98 Mar 99 reorganisation of production and improved competitiveness. The result has been an increase in orders, which now stands at 15 vessels of which 13 cruiseships. Chantiers de l’Atlantique is taking full advantage of the growth in demand for cruiseships, going from fourth to first place among builders, tying with Italy in terms of number of vessels. This niche market, with competition until now essentially European, is the principal source of its orderbook. It is always risky to specialise in one vessel type, but Europeans have little choice, something the French had the perspicacity to recognise early on. Regarding continued growth in the cruiseship sector, future can be foreseen with serenity. The closing of Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre must unfortunately be mentioned. The shipyard was experiencing enormous difficulties in carrying out a contract for three very sophisticated chemical carriers that had been concluded in 1995. Only one vessel could be delivered this year, with the second one probably to be completed by another shipyard and the third order cancelled. Chantiers de l’Atlantique has received firm orders for eight cruiseships, excluding options: • Two 702-passenger vessels for Renaissance Cruises. • Two 1,500-passenger vessels for Festival Cruises. • Two 1,900-passenger vessels for Royal Caribbean International. • Two 1,950-passenger vessels for P&O. The shipyard delivered three ships: Jun 99 Percentage 25 Sep 99 • The "R Three" and "R Four", 702-passenger vessels to Renaissance Cruises. • "Mistral", a 1,260-passenger vessel to Festival Cruises. 20 15 10 5 0 T h e s h i p b u i l d i n g m a r k e t S H I P P I N G A N D S H I P B U I L D I N G M A R K E T S 2 0 0 0 15
Page 3 and 4: Bad and good reasons ? At the end o
Page 5 and 6: The shipbuilding market in 1999 The
Page 7 and 8: Quarterly orders in gross tonnage (
Page 9 and 10: In contrast, most Chinese shipyards
Page 11 and 12: As an example, production costs for
Page 13: China As it was the case last year,
Page 17 and 18: The Asian challenge is clearly felt
Page 19 and 20: Norway Norwegian shipyards, which a
Page 21 and 22: The cruise market in 1999 1998 was
Page 23 and 24: success. Carnival tried in vain to
Page 25 and 26: European sector. Very few second-ha
Page 27 and 28: The containership market in 1999 Br
Page 29 and 30: (before absorption), Evergreen, P&O
Page 31 and 32: Teu 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000
Page 33 and 34: 4,000-4,999 teu 17% 3,000-3,999 teu
Page 35 and 36: The reefership market in 1999 Anoth
Page 37 and 38: The spot market Compared to 1998, t
Page 39 and 40: concluded until very late. • Expo
Page 41 and 42: The dry bulk market in 1999 The pes
Page 43 and 44: 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Jan 96 US$/tonne
Page 45 and 46: US$/day 15,000 13,000 11,000 9,000
Page 47 and 48: older ladies in the 15 years-old br
Page 49 and 50: The tanker market in 1999 Crude •
Page 51 and 52: 15% At the same time, youth in the
Page 53 and 54: for us just how stagnant this marke
Page 55 and 56: their specifications and their SBT
Page 57 and 58: Dwt 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000
Page 59 and 60: The chemical carrier market in 1999
Page 61 and 62: the previous year. Deliveries for t
Page 63 and 64: There are two corollaries to this.
Page 65 and 66:
The liquefied petroleum gas shippin
Page 67 and 68:
We believe that further consolidati
Page 69 and 70:
In this respect, the Chevron/Dynegy
Page 71 and 72:
Perceptions As mentioned, the conso
Page 73 and 74:
The liquefied natural gas shipping
Page 75 and 76:
In Malaysia, the Japanese market wi
Page 77 and 78:
The offshore market in 1999 Allow u
Page 79 and 80:
The oil-drilling world also acknowl
Page 81 and 82:
35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000
Page 83 and 84:
The fishing vessel market in 1999 D
Page 85 and 86:
45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000
Page 87 and 88:
The marine insurance markets in 199
Page 89 and 90:
of future resources in order to mee
Page 91 and 92:
French shipyards deliveries and ord
Page 93 and 94:
Chantiers Piriou • Ships delivere
Page 95 and 96:
French orders to foreign shipyards
Page 97 and 98:
• Samsung (South Korea) FDS 2000
show all

French orders to foreign shipyards

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?