Interlude - Index of

Strategic Change | 151
The flaw with my arguments, James said, was that they
had a NetApp bias because they were based on our employees,
engineers, and salespeople. James looked at our market
opportunity and our potential customers. He argued that
SAN was an enormous market—much larger than NAS—and
many companies wouldn’t even consider doing business with
us because they thought NAS was too low-end. If we could do
SAN, then at least we’d be in the door. And finally, he argued
that much of the engineering investment required for SAN
would be needed anyway for NAS. As we moved upmarket,
our customers requested that we add more and more high-end
SAN features into our NAS system. Adding support for SAN’s
special network wasn’t that big a deal—he argued—compared
to all the other work we had to do anyway.
Back and forth it went.
Dan, our CEO, wanted to get the Board of Directors up
to speed on SAN and NAS, so he asked James and me to share
our views. Most CEOs try to hide internal dissent from their
boards, not display it front and center, so it is a testament to
Dan’s open and honest relationship with our board that he
would encourage two founders to debate in front of them.
I remember Don Valentine, the chairman of the board, asking
me, “Have any of your customers ever asked you for SAN?”
“Yes,” I admitted.
This was shortly after the dot-com crash, and Valentine’s
input was simple: “In this economy, if someone wants to give
you their money, I recommend that you take it.” This clarity
of thought is why Valentine gets to be chairman.
James was right and I was wrong.
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