Interlude - Index of

26 | Beginnings
People were spending a billion dollars a year on regular UNIX
computers to do network storage, and the market was growing
fast. Sun was the market share leader, and we hoped for
the same success against them as Cisco's. We copied Cisco’s
business model and would later go after the same investors
that funded them. Eventually, the chairman of Cisco’s Board
of Directors became the chairman of ours.
We planned to build our system out of the same cheap
processor chips that powered desktop PCs. This was possible
because we were targeting the very low end of the market and
also because we weren’t running a full-powered operating system
like Windows or UNIX. This was one of the advantages
of an appliance. Going after the low end was a good strategic
decision for reasons we wouldn’t fully understand for many
years.
Finally, the idea felt good because it was right in the sweet
spot of my experience. I had done related technical work in
college, at MIPS, and at Auspex, so I had strong intuition
about both the technology and the customers. Even as the
juniormost engineer at Auspex, I had a track record of spotting
features that customers wanted. By contrast, in our penbased
venture, both James and I always felt like beginners.
We were trying to write an application to solve the problems
of busy executives trying to manage complicated schedules,
but neither of us had been a busy executive. A start-up that
doesn’t understand its customers is doomed. Even if the penbased
sector took off, we probably wouldn’t have been very
successful. In retrospect, it seems obvious: stick with what you
know—design a product you would buy and use yourself.
Even before we raised any money, I started programming
on my PC at home. We thought our design would be fast but