2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Friday, April 13 – 2:35 pm – 4:10 pm
1-109 ROUNDTABLE: PATHS TO POWER: ANALYZING
THE CAREERS OF NANCY PELOSI AND
HILLARY CLINTON (Co-sponsored with Gender and
Politics, see 28-101)
Room Red Lacquer, 4 th Floor, Fri at 2:35 pm
Chair Michele L. Swers, Georgetown University
Panelist Kathryn Pearson, University of Minnesota
Debra Dodson, Eagleton Institute
Cindy Simon Rosenthal, University of Oklahoma
Sarah Brewer, American University
Overview: Scholars on this roundtable will discuss the leadership
style and challenges faced by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
(D-CA) and potential presidential candidate Senator Hillary
Clinton (D-NY).
2-8 EXPLAINING COOPERATION: EMPLOYERS,
SOCIAL PACTS AND CORPORATISM
Room Salon 1, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 2:35 pm
Chair Patrick Bernhagen, University of Aberdeen
Paper Policy by Contract: Social Pacts in Australia and New Zealand
John S. Ahlquist, University of Washington
Overview: I propose a model of union-government "social pacts",
tested via the empirical puzzle of why Australia signed a pact in
the 1980s while New Zealand did not. The discussion relies on
over 40 interviews with key policy makers in both countries.
Paper Redefining Corporatism: Functional Corporatism in Modern
Nations
Gina A. Del Priore-Loera, University of Illinois, Chicago
Overview: Development of corporatism is assessed using a
multinomial logistic model using data from eighty countries.
Probability of developing a functional corporate state is dependent
on historical/cultural experience, level of modernization, and
social unrest.
Paper Politics of Employer Coordination
Alexander G. Kuo, Stanford University
Overview: What explains the political organization of employers
across countries? Sector characteristics and initial linkages
between certain sectors and the state can account for variation in
the roles of employer organizations across states.
Paper The Political Origins of Coordinated Capitalism
Cathie Jo Martin, Boston University
Duane H. Swank, Marquette University
Overview: This paper seeks to explain the causes of employer
organization during the early decades of industrial capitalism. We
argue that the electoral and party system and state structures shape
the choices employers make about collective organization.
Paper Supporting the "Varieties of Capitalism" with Partisan
Equilibrium
Brandon C. Zicha, SUNY, Binghamton
Steve B. Lem, SUNY, Binghamton
Overview: We argue that as larger blocs of voters have a stake in
pro-welfare collective bargaining agreements, vote-seeking major
right parties will become less traditionally “right” on issues that
are of specific importance to collective bargainers.
Disc. Patrick Bernhagen, University of Aberdeen
3-7 ELECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
Room Salon 2, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 2:35 pm
Chair Mona M. Lyne, University of South Carolina
Paper Political Knowledge and Political Attitudes and Behavior in
Mexico
Maria F. Boidi, Vanderbilt University
Overview: This study explores the consequences of political
knowledge for citizens’ participation in politics and for attitudes
toward political tolerance and preference for democracy in
Mexico.
Paper Judicial Independence in Venezuela
Lesley M. Burns, University of British Columbia
Overview: This study explores the role the Venezuelan Supreme
Court has played in the increased electoral representation of Hugo
Chavez since 1998.
Page | 170
Paper Forging a New Social Contract? Bolivia's 2006 Constituent
Assembly Election
Miguel Centellas, Dickinson College
Overview: This paper provides an analysis of the July 2006
Bolivian constituent assembly election in historical political
perspective, with particular attention to the country’s recent
regional polarization.
Paper Income, Ideology and Ticket Splitting Voting in Brazil
Eduardo L. Leoni, Harvard University
Overview: We combine roll call data and aggregate level electoral
data to investigate the issue of split-ticketing voting in Brazil.
Disc. Mona M. Lyne, University of South Carolina
3-16 POLITICAL COMPETITION AND POLICY
REFORM
Room Salon 4, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 2:35 pm
Chair Pedro J. Sanoja, Temple University
Paper Redistributive Politics and the Poor
Christian Ponce de Leon, University of Chicago
Overview: This paper presents a formal model of redistributive
taxation to represent the causal relation between political regimes
in developing countries and their political capacity to implement
poverty alleviation policies. Empirical evidence is provided.
Paper The Political Economy of Poverty Alleviation: The Case of
PROGRESA in Mexico
Yuriko Takahashi, Cornell University
Overview: Focusing on Mexico’s Program for Education, Health,
and Nutrition (PROGRESA), this study examines whether the
distribution in 2000 was used for electoral purposes, and if it did,
what form the manipulation took under the neoliberal policy
constraint.
Paper The Politics of Dollar Scarcity in Latin America
Daniela Campello, University of California, Los Angeles
Overview: I analyze a sample of 89 elections during 25 years in
order to check whether the need to attract foreign investment in
periods of dollar scarcity contributes to explain a post electoral
"move to the right" by progressive candidates in Latin America.
Disc. Guillelrmo Trejo, Duke University
Pedro J. Sanoja, Temple University
4-8 NEW THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO TRANSITIONS TO
DEMOCRACY
Room PDR 4, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 2:35 pm
Chair Hiroki Takeuchi, University of California, Los Angeles
Paper Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation
Milan Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Overview: I investigate the determinants and the dynamics of
authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation. A novel
estimation technique, a split-population model, is applied to data
on authoritarian reversals.
Paper Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Stability of
Democracy
Taeko Hiroi, University of Texas, El Paso
Sawa Omori, University of Tokyo
Overview: Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that
presidential regimes are not more susceptible to democratic
breakdowns than parliamentary regimes.
Paper Gambling on Reform
Jay Ulfelder, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC)
Overview: Focused on the tensions between transaction costs,
economic performance, and opportunity for political mobilization,
this paper uses game theory to generate an alternative explanation
for some expansions of civil liberties under authoritarian rule.
Paper Power and Politics: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Revisited
Matthew R. Golder, Florida State University
Sona N. Golder, Florida State University
William R. Clark, University of Michigan
Overview: We present a game-theoretic model in which we
reformulate and extend Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty (EVL) argument to examine the role of power in the