2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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9-5 FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC REGION -<br />
ISSUE AREAS<br />
Room Sandburg 5, 7 th Floor, Fri at 9:50 am<br />
Chair Timothy J. Haas, San Francisco State University<br />
Paper Japan in Asia<br />
Timothy J. Haas, San Francisco State University<br />
Overview: Japan faces many new opportunities and challenges in<br />
the 21st century, and if properly equipped, may take advantage of<br />
its situation in order to emerge as a bastion of security and<br />
economic stability in the region.<br />
Paper Japan-Taiwan Relations: Unofficial in Name Only<br />
Jing Sun, University of Denver<br />
Overview: This article examines how diplomatic maneuvering at<br />
the elite level and mutual penetration of popular cultures at the<br />
mass level have jointly strengthened Japan-Taiwan relations to a<br />
status that can termed as "unofficial in name only."<br />
Paper Will The Future Taiwan Strait War Impede China’s<br />
Development?<br />
Jing Nie, University of Toledo<br />
Overview: Taiwan might be the only place which can trigger<br />
military confrontations between two major powers. Any<br />
miscalculation among China, U.S. and Taiwan will lead to<br />
conflict. This paper is a careful calculation of Beijing’s cost and<br />
benefit.<br />
Disc. Timothy J. Haas, San Francisco State University<br />
13-12 PRE-POST-COMMUNISM?<br />
Room Sandburg 4, 7 th Floor, Fri at 9:50 am<br />
Chair Michele L. Crumley, Mercyhurst College<br />
Paper Beyond Elections: Leadership and Mass-Elite Linkages in<br />
Rural China<br />
Wei Shan, Texas A&M University<br />
Overview: Based on the literature of mass-elite linkage and<br />
political leadership, this paper attempts to address the role of<br />
leadership relation as an informal interpersonal influence process<br />
in shaping citizen-elite agreement on policy issues.<br />
Paper Cuba's Revolutionary Reform<br />
Jennifer W. Howk, Harvard University<br />
Overview: This paper presents a general framework for<br />
understanding authoritarian legitimacy and regime change in weak<br />
Leninist states by examining ideological and institutional<br />
innovation in post-Soviet Cuba.<br />
Paper Ossification and Renewal in the Cuban <strong>Political</strong> Elite<br />
Salomon Berman, Georgetown University<br />
Overview: This paper explores the generational transition in the<br />
Cuban political elite. While it is impossible to predict whether<br />
regime change is to occur in a post-Castro Cuba, it will not occur<br />
because of an elite failure to rejuvenate.<br />
Paper The Rentier Thesis in Central Asia: The Importance of<br />
Development Strategy<br />
Pascael Barclay, Emory University<br />
Overview: The rentier literature says little about how resource<br />
wealth translates into authoritarianism. This paper contributes to<br />
the literature by examining how the intervening variable of<br />
development strategy affects this relationship in Central Asia.<br />
Paper Democratic Habits through Non-Democratic Means<br />
Svitlana Chernykh, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign<br />
Overview: This paper argues that non-competitive Soviet elections<br />
had the power to socialize the citizenry into democratic practices<br />
such as voting. The findings show that turnout patterns in post-<br />
Soviet republics resemble established democracies.<br />
Disc. Wei Shan, Texas A&M University<br />
Khalil Dokhanchi, University of Wisconsin, Superior<br />
14-14 TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND PROTECTION<br />
Room Sandburg 2, 7 th Floor, Fri at 9:50 am<br />
Chair Alexandra Guisinger, University of Notre Dame<br />
Paper Currency Unions and the Demand for Protection<br />
Lena Schaffer, ETH, Zurich<br />
Overview: We theoretically develop and empirically test the<br />
argument that currency unions can entail increased levels of<br />
protection as import-competing producers lobby for artificial<br />
barriers to trade to replace natural protection via currency risk.<br />
Page | 146<br />
Paper Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries<br />
Su-Hyun Lee, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor<br />
Overview: This paper analyzes the effects of political institutions<br />
on trade liberalization of developing countries. While democracies<br />
tend to lower trade barriers than autocracies, the effects of regime<br />
types depend on the number of institutional veto points.<br />
Paper The Fear of Litigation During Negotiations Over WTO<br />
Disputes<br />
Xiaowen Zhang, University of Southern California<br />
Overview: This paper aims to enrich our understanding about<br />
what factors influence countries' decisions about the timing of<br />
settling WTO trade disputes.<br />
Paper Trade Policy Index and Governance Variables—Crosscountry<br />
Analysis<br />
Joel L. Raveloharimisy, Western Michigan University<br />
Overview: The purpose of this paper is to present a model that<br />
explains the relationship between governance effectiveness and<br />
trade policy. I hypothesize that higher quality governance should<br />
lead to less protectionism.<br />
Paper From NAFTA to China? Production Shifts and the Future of<br />
Regionalization<br />
Sara Jane McCaffrey, Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy<br />
Marcos Ancelovici, Massachusetts Institute of Technology<br />
Overview: Contrary to predictions of three important trading<br />
blocks in an increasingly regionalized world, a major shift of<br />
production from NAFTA to Asia since 2000 suggests that the<br />
presumed political and economic clout of regions may be inflated.<br />
Disc. Daniel Y. Kono, University of California, Davis<br />
14-16 IMF POLITICS<br />
Room Parlor H, 6 th Floor, Fri at 9:50 am<br />
Chair Jonathan R. Strand, University of Nevada, Las Vegas<br />
Paper Structural Adjustment and Its Impact on Economic Human<br />
Rights, 1981-2003<br />
Mohammed R. Abouharb, Louisiana State University<br />
David L. Cingranelli, Binghamton University<br />
Overview: World Bank and International Monetary Fund<br />
structural adjustment policies promote rapid neo-liberal economic<br />
liberalization as a tool for development. They negatively impact<br />
respect for economic and social rights in developing countries<br />
between 1981-2004<br />
Paper Does Adjustment Lending Work? Policy Reforms in the Wake<br />
of <strong>Program</strong> Lending<br />
Daniel L. Nielson, Brigham Young University<br />
Joshua D. Loud, Brigham Young University<br />
Overview: Employing the Project-Level Aid (PLAID) dataset, this<br />
paper tests the effects of adjustment programs from multi- and<br />
bilateral sources on trade liberalization, stabilization, and budget<br />
deficits.<br />
Paper Explaining Multilateral Debt Forgiveness<br />
Michael D. Schmidt, American University<br />
Overview: This paper constructs a model to account for the<br />
creation and development of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries<br />
initiative, a program managed by the World Bank and IMF that<br />
bargains governmental reforms for rescheduling and forgiveness<br />
of debt.<br />
Paper Developing Capacity: The Impact of IMF Lending on State<br />
Capacity<br />
Christine L. Harper, University of North Texas<br />
Overview: The paper examines whether administrative capacity in<br />
borrowing countries benefits from the governance-related<br />
conditionality reforms mandated by the IMF since 1996, and<br />
whether administrative capacity influences IMF lending patterns.<br />
Disc. Mark Copelovitch, University of Wisconsin, Madison<br />
15-6 ALLIANCES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS<br />
THEORY<br />
Room Salon 5, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 9:50 am<br />
Chair Sarah E. Croco, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor<br />
Paper Alliances amongst Terrorist Groups<br />
Kanisha D. Bond, Pennsylvania State University<br />
Overview: Identifies conditions under which terrorist groups form<br />
security alliances, using two game-theoretic models of