2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association
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4-9 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS - PERSPECTIVES<br />
FROM EAST ASIA<br />
Room PDR 4, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 4:25 pm<br />
Chair Youngtae Shin, University of Central Oklahoma<br />
Paper A Recount of Illiberal Democracy: Misrepresenting Pacific<br />
Asia Ten Years On<br />
Eric H. Honda, Independent Researcher<br />
Overview: This paper will argue that the supposed rise of illiberal<br />
democracy in Pacific Asia defies such criteria. Based on Freedom<br />
House Rankings (between 1996-2006), the subsequent<br />
foundations do not support frameworks of illiberal democracy.<br />
Paper A Comparative Analysis of Democratization in South Korea<br />
and Taiwan<br />
Chen Pao Chou, Hamline University<br />
John A. Grummel, University of South Carolina, Upstate<br />
Overview: This research applies a multidimensional utilizing both<br />
macro- and micro-level approaches as well as historical and<br />
contextual factors to examine democratization in South Korea and<br />
Taiwan.<br />
Paper Democratization or Other? Factors of the Democratic<br />
Evaluation in East Asia<br />
Fu-Yi Yang, University of Oregon<br />
Overview: Five East Asian countries experienced the democratic<br />
transition in 1990s. Is democracy consolidated in the region? This<br />
paper distinguishes factors relevant to democratization and<br />
examines what factors impact on the evaluation of democracy the<br />
most.<br />
Disc. Jeeyang Baum, University of California, San Diego<br />
5-5 THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEADERSHIP SURVIVAL<br />
Room Salon 5, 3 rd Floor, Fri at 4:25 pm<br />
Chair Brian F. Crisp, Washington University, St. Louis<br />
Paper Electoral Uncertainty and the Stability of Coalition<br />
Governments<br />
Daniela Iorio, University of Pennsylvania<br />
Overview: I develop a strategic model of government formation<br />
and termination, and structurally estimate it. The counterfactual<br />
experiments evaluate the effects of electoral uncertainty and<br />
institutional features on the stability of coalition governments.<br />
Paper Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies<br />
Young Hun Kim, Pennsylvania State University<br />
Donna L. Bahry, Pennsylvania State University<br />
Overview: 40 percent of countries with popularly elected<br />
presidents in Third Wave democracies have resigned or been<br />
removed from office before their terms ended. We examine the<br />
roots of presidential vulnerability in Third Wave democracies,<br />
1974 through 2003.<br />
Paper Semi-Presidential Systems: Separating Myth from Reality<br />
Svitlana Chernykh, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign<br />
Overview: Research on semi-presidential systems argues that<br />
these systems are inherently unstable. This paper offers a new<br />
measure of cabinet duration and shows that semi-presidential<br />
cabinet life spans are not different from parliamentary ones.<br />
Paper Tying the Dictator's Hands: Leadership Survival in<br />
Authoritarian Regimes<br />
Erica Frantz, University of California, Los Angeles<br />
Overview: I look at how the institutional structures of<br />
dictatorships affect leadership tenure rates. I analyze how<br />
differences in the nature of the elite coalition in single party,<br />
military, and personalist regimes affect the survival of the dictator.<br />
Paper <strong>Political</strong> Institutions and Executive Survival: Empirical<br />
Weaknesses and Theoretical Revisions of Selectorate Theory<br />
in the Non-Democratic Context<br />
Ryan Kennedy, Ohio State University<br />
Andrew McKenna,<br />
Overview: Building on foundations of "selectorate theory"<br />
developed by De Mesquita, Morrow, Silverstein and Smith, this<br />
paper suggests both empirical weaknesses and theoretical<br />
revisions that are necessary in non-democratic contexts.<br />
Disc. Christopher Kam, University of British Columbia<br />
Brian F. Crisp, Washington University, St. Louis<br />
7-10 TIME AND INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE<br />
Room Sandburg 7, 7 th Floor, Fri at 4:25 pm<br />
Chair Tobias Hofmann, Princeton University<br />
Paper The Strategic Use of EU-Referendums in Great Britain and<br />
Denmark<br />
Rasmus L. Nielsen, University of Southern Denmark<br />
Overview: The paper presents a game-theoretical framework to<br />
EU-referendums, a most-different-system-design comparative<br />
case study, and an analytical account as to why Britain and<br />
Denmark render similar observable elite-strategies of electoral<br />
vote-seeking.<br />
Paper Strategically Timing the Announcement of Referendums: The<br />
Case of the EU Constitution<br />
Tobias Schulz, University of Zurich<br />
Overview: The underlying motivation of a referendum on the EU<br />
constitution is revealed by an examination of the timing of the<br />
referendum announcements. The results suggest that the timing is<br />
merely determined by strategic considerations.<br />
Disc. Gabriele Birnberg, London School of Economics<br />
8-9 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN<br />
LATIN AMERICA<br />
Room Sandburg 6, 7 th Floor, Fri at 4:25 pm<br />
Chair Felipe Botero, Universidad de los Andes<br />
Paper “Unite and Reign.” When do Presidents Ask for Delegated<br />
Decree Authority?<br />
Ana Carolina Garriga, University of Pittsburgh<br />
Juan J. Negri-Malbran, University of Pittsburgh<br />
Overview: Why do Presidents ask for delegated decree authority<br />
(DDA) when they already have a majority in Congress that will<br />
allow their legislation to pass? This paper analyzes the presidents’<br />
incentives for asking DDA using data from Latin American<br />
countries<br />
Paper Presidentialism and Democratic Breakdown in Latin America:<br />
Too Many or Too Few Legislative Checks?<br />
Mona M. Lyne, University of South Carolina<br />
Scott Morgenstern, University of Pittsburgh<br />
Overview: We review evidence for divided government and<br />
gridlock as cause of democratic breakdown and find it wanting.<br />
We suggest that the problem in fact is the legislatures inability to<br />
check presidents that leads to breakdown.<br />
Paper Colombian Presidents: Fated to Repeat the Past? Studying<br />
Uribe's Re-election<br />
Patricia H. Micolta, Florida International University<br />
Overview: Colombian executive-legislative relations are a<br />
dynamic between reformist executives and obtrusive legislatures.<br />
Alvaro Uribe averted this trend by reforming the presidential<br />
reelection. How did he avoid being a lame-duck?<br />
Paper Legislative Delegation and Presidential Power: Constitutional<br />
Limits and Judicial Response in Chile and Argentina<br />
Druscilla L. Scribner, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh<br />
Overview: Comparative analysis of legislative delegation in Chile<br />
and Argentina over last century based on landmark decisions<br />
focused on understanding historical differences and current<br />
similarities in how the courts define the boundaries of power.<br />
Paper Incentives and Consequences of Presidents’ Spoils<br />
Distribution Strategies<br />
Cesar Zucco, University of California, Los Angeles<br />
Overview: In this paper I present a formal model of presidentiallegislative<br />
relations in multiparty systems, discuss its results, and<br />
test some of its implications using data from Brazil and Uruguay.<br />
Disc. Patricio Navia, New York University<br />
9-8 REFORMING ASIAN EDUCATION<br />
Room Sandburg 5, 7 th Floor, Fri at 4:25 pm<br />
Chair Eric C. Browne, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee<br />
Paper Academic Achievement, Government Spending and Inequality<br />
in Japan<br />
Tomoaki Nomi, Southeast Missouri State University<br />
Overview: This study tries to discover the impacts of education<br />
spending by the government on the performance level of<br />
secondary school students in Japan.<br />
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