2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Paper A Systems Theory Understanding of Terrorism with
Implications for Policy
Miriam E. Mendelson, University of Akron
Overview: An examination of the global Islamist terror movement
from a complex systems perspective. This includes an overview of
the terror system and its components, how this relates to systems
theory and what are its implications for counterterrorism policy.
Disc. Jane Kim, University of Essex
Rashida Hussain, Wright State University
20-5 CITIZENSHIP: THE NATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD
Room Salon 1, 3 rd Floor, Sat at 2:35 pm
Chair Devashree Gupta, Carleton College
Paper What Does it Mean to be American? Values, Identity and
Patriotism
Rebecca E. Blanton, City University of New York
Overview: Results from a survey that directly questions people
about their civic beliefs, their commitment to the American Creed,
and the feelings of patriotism are presented.
Paper Advocating Tolerance or Division: Multiculturalism Contested
Annika M. Hinze, University of Illinois, Chicago
Overview: The politics of multiculturalism has been a significant
variable in debating the treatment of minority groups in Western
democracies. This paper explores the contestedness of the term
itself and the influence of its implementation.
Paper Can American Democracy Be Sustained? Immigration,
Diversity, and Conflict
Joel Lieske, Cleveland State University
Overview: Using data for nation states and the American states
and counties, this paper explores the implications and
consequences of expansionist immigration policies that are
making the U. S. more racially, ethnically, religiously, and
socially diverse.
Paper States and Their Citizens Abroad: Dual Citizenship as a State
Strategy
Sybil D. Rhodes, Western Michigan University
Arus Harutyunyan, Western Michigan University
Overview: Examines the conditions under which countries decide
to tolerate or encourage multiple citizenship, with case studies of
Armenia, Mexico, and Spain.
Disc. Devashree Gupta, Carleton College
21-14 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC
NATURE OF COOPERATION (Co-sponsored with
Formal Modeling, see 34-15)
Room Parlor F, 6 th Floor, Sat at 2:35 pm
Chair Nathan A. Collins, Stanford University
Paper Institutional Rules and the Evolution of Preferences: A
Computer Simulation
Douglas R. Oxley, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Kevin B. Smith, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Overview: A computer simulation is used to evaluate the impact
of institutional rules on the evolution of cooperation.
Paper Social Cues Speed the Determination of Cooperative Type in
Economic Games
John M. Fulwider, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Rhonda Saferstein, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Overview: Do social cues affect cooperation in economic games?
We compare results from a standard, text-based presentation of the
public goods game with a presentation where players see
photographs and names of the other players.
Paper Sociality as a Defensive Response to Loss: Laboratory
Experiments
Mikhail G. Myagkov, University of Oregon
John Orbell, University of Oregon
Timothy Johnson, Stanford University
Overview: We report experimental results of how framing (gains
vs. losses) affect behavior (and decision to enter) in games
involving cooperation, altruistic punishment, games of status,
ultimatum games etc. Experiments are conducted in Russia and in
the U.S.
Paper The Evolution of Cooperation Among Strangers in One Shot
PD Games
Oleg Smirnov, University of Miami
Tim Johnson, Stanford University
Overview: We present a model where cooperation evolves in a
population of organisms that play one-shot games with randomly
determined partners whose past choices are unknown. Cooperation
evolves via a simple strategy, which we call COEQUAL.
Paper Evolution of Altruistic Punishment: Effects of Information
and Group Size
Eser Sekercioglu, Stony Brook University
Overview: An evolutionary game theoretic model of altruistic
punishment is developed with two novelties: Effects of the size of
group providing the public good and cost of information (i.e. cost
of monitoring for cheaters).
Disc. Nathan A. Collins, Stanford University
22-11 STRATEGIC VOTING
Room Salon 8, 3 rd Floor, Sat at 2:35 pm
Chair Meredith Rolfe, University of Oxford
Paper Efficient Information Aggregation with Costly Voting
Vijay Krishna, Pennsylvania State University
John Morgan, University of California, Berkeley
Overview: We show that sincere voting is an equilibrium of
majority-rule and unanimity-rule voting games with private
information and privately known costs of participation. The
informational efficiency of these equilibria in large electorates is
analyzed.
Paper Voting for Coalitions: Strategic Voting under Proportional
Representation
Matias A. Bargsted, University of Michigan
Orit Kedar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Overview: We demonstrate that voters in PR systems vote based
on expectations about coalition composition. In particular, they
employ Duvergerian logic: when expecting an unfavorable
coalition, they desert their first choice and endorse a lesser of
evils.
Paper Measuring Strategic Voting in a Single-Member Plurality
System
Andre Blais, Universite de Montreal
Marc A. Bodet, McGill University
Overview: This paper tests two methods of measuring strategic
voting in SMP systems. We argue for an improved simulation
method – one which is more theoretically appealing, and in some
cases will yield more robust estimates of strategic voting.
Paper Learning Strategic Voting: Tactical Voting in Hungarian
Elections, 1994-2002
James W. Endersby, University of Missouri
Agnes Simon, University of Missouri
Overview: Using data at the polling place level, this paper
investigates strategic voting in a mixed, two-round electoral
system and trends in tactical behavior across several parliamentary
elections in the post-communist, transitional democracy of
Hungary.
Paper The Social Underpinnings of Strategic Voting: Priming in a
Primary
Anand E. Sokhey, Ohio State University
Overview: This paper examines strategic voting in a gubernatorial
primary election, positing that such behavior can be explained by
political discussion – in social networks and civic organizations –
priming considerations of candidate electability.
Disc. Meredith Rolfe, University of Oxford
23-9 CAMPAIGN FIELD EXPERIMENTS
Room PDR 5, 3 rd Floor, Sat at 2:35 pm
Chair Brian J. Brox, Tulane University
Paper Political Posters: (How) Do They Affect Viewers? An
Experimental Approach
Delia Dumitrescu, Ohio State University
Overview: Using an experimental design, this paper proposes two
psychological mechanisms by which repeated exposure to political
posters might impact individual attitudes: (1) increase attitude
accessibility; (2) increase group liking through “mere exposure”.
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