2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

38-8 PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATIONS (Co-sponsored with
Public Administration, see 50-21)
Room LaSalle 3, 7 th Floor, Sat at 12:45 pm
Chair Richard Waterman, University of Kentucky
Paper Presidential Staffing and Public Opinion
Justin S. Vaughn, Texas A&M University
Jose D. Villalobos, Texas A&M University
Overview: We examine the influence that the dynamics of
presidential issue approval have on strategic presidential staffing
decisions. To do so, we employ data concerning presidential
appointments to key EOP agencies and issue-specific presidential
approval.
Paper Presidential Unilateralism: Theory and Evidence
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, University of Rochester
Fang-Yi Chiou, Academia Sinica
Overview: The possibility of the president exercising unilateral
action, moving the status quo in a manner not requiring positive
legislative assent and which the judiciary finds acceptable, has
received much recent scholarly attention.
Paper Revisiting the Presidency in the Neoadministrative State
John C. Bumgarner, Virginia Tech University
Overview: The centralization and politicization of the executive
branch and utilization of the unitary executive theory runs counter
to the neoadministrative state; thus, the governing approach of the
presidency must be revisisted.
Paper Seizing Domestic Tranquility: Presidential Military
Intervention during America’s Industrialization
Dan Kenney, Brandeis University
Overview: Utilizing archival data, this paper concentrates on the
last 30 years of the 19 th century when the U.S. experienced the
largest proportion of labor unrest in the industrializing world. It
posits a typological theory of Presidential use of domestic military
intervention that argues such intervention was most likely to when
state-level petitions for troops came in the wake of violence and
when unrest was not tied to a coordinated campaign of
lawlessness.
Disc. Wayne Steger, DePaul University
Richard Waterman, University of Kentucky
39-9 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING AND PORK
BARREL POLITICS
Room Montrose 1, 7 th Floor, Sat at 12:45 pm
Chair Diana Evans, Trinity College
Paper Patronage as Representation: Senate Majority Leaders and
Distributive Politics
Andrea C. Hatcher, University of the South
Overview: Using archival data, this paper examines the role of
U.S. Senate Majority Leaders in securing earmarks and
appropriations for their states. Findings suggest both success and
failure in distributive politics carry important electoral
consequences.
Paper Fiscal Effects on Credit-Claiming and Blame-Avoidance in
Appropriations
Stonegarden Grindlife, University of California, Los Angeles
Overview: At what level of reduction in the annual outlays in an
appropriations bill are congressional members activated to engage
in blame-avoidance? What level of growth activates creditclaiming?
Paper The Majority Party and 'the Cohesive Power of Public
Plunder'
Royce A. Carroll, University of California, San Diego
Henry A. Kim, University of California, San Diego
Overview: Examines the relationship between inclusion in
majority policy coalitions and the distribution of targeted
resources.
Paper Congressional Earmarks and the Pursuit of Policy Expertise
Jason A. MacDonald, Kent State University
Overview: A duration analysis of appropriations earmarks is
conducted to assess whether Congress uses earmarks to encourage
the creation of scientific knowledge to address complex policy
problems.
Paper Earmark Explosion: Why Legislative Use of the Earmark has
Skyrocketed in the Last Decade
Wendy R. Ginsberg, University of Pennsylvania
Overview: Using juvenile justice as a case study, this paper aims
to explain the recent burgeoning growth of earmarks, a legislative
tool Congress uses to pinpoint its power of the purse. Earmarks
have taken over entire budgets in some federal offices.
Disc. Diana Evans, Trinity College
Sarah E. Anderson, Stanford University
41-11 SEPARATION OF POWERS IN ACTION
Room Parlor E, 6 th Floor, Sat at 12:45 pm
Chair Kirk A. Randazzo, University of Kentucky
Paper Specifying External Strategic Constraints in Supreme Court
Decision Making
Brandon L. Bartels, Stony Brook University
Overview: Based on a “heterogeneity in decision making”
approach, I provide a theoretical and empirical clarification of
“external strategic constraint” in Supreme Court decision making.
I use a multilevel modeling framework to test the hypotheses.
Paper Beginning at the Beginning: The Decision to Legislate and the
SOP
Bethany Blackstone, Emory University
Overview: A formal model of SOP interactions is employed to
evaluate the conditions under which anticipation of negative
treatment by the Supreme Court leads Congress to refrain from
enacting legislation. Empirical tests use data from the Judiciary
Committees.
Paper Policy Outcomes and the Role of the Public in Court-Congress
Relations
Thomson W. McFarland, University of Colorado, Boulder
Overview: I present a formal model of Court-Congress interaction
that incorporates the level of public support for the Court. I test
the model using a novel dataset including ideal point estimates for
the players involved disaggregated across issue areas.
Paper Judicial Professionalism and Separation of Powers in the
States
Joseph V. Ross, University of Arizona
Overview: This paper offers a measure of state supreme court
professionalism and tests whether an imbalance in resources
across branches of state government leads to retaliatory behavior.
Paper An Empirical Test of the Constitutional Separation of Powers
Model
Jeffrey A. Segal, Stony Brook University
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Vanderbilt University
Chad Westerland, University of Arizona
Overview: We test recent Separation of Powers models, which
argue that the Supreme Court defers to expected Congressional
majorities in deciding Constitutional cases.
Disc. Tonja Jacobi, Northwestern University
Kirk A. Randazzo, University of Kentucky
41-23 ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW AND
PROTECTING RIGHTS (Co-sponsored by Public
Law, see 42-18)
Room Burnham 1, 7 th Floor, Sat at 12:45 pm
Chair Mark C. Miller, Clark University
Paper Judging Democracy in Emerging Democracies
Shannon I. Smithey, Westminster College
Overview: Democratic theorists worry that judicial power will
undermine democratic institutions. Analysis of decisions made by
the Constitutional Courts of Lithuania and the Czech Republic
reveal that courts can actually facilitate democratic development.
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