2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

Thursday, April 12 – 12:45 pm – 2:20 pm
1-113 ROUNDTABLE: HAVING AND DOING IT ALL:
ACHIEVING A WORK-LIFE BALANCE (Cosponsored
with Midwest Women's Caucus, see 57-102)
Room Red Lacquer, 4 th Floor, Thur at 12:45 pm
Chair Christina Wolbrecht, University of Notre Dame
Panelist Lynne E. Ford, College of Charleston
Trudy Steuernagel, Kent State University
Michael Brintnall, American Political Science Association
Lisa Baldez, Dartmouth University
Overview: This roundtable will discuss strategies for successful
balance of professional and personal goals and responsibilities.
2-2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM
Room Salon 1, 3 rd Floor, Thur at 12:45 pm
Chair Ronald Rogowski, University of California, Los Angeles
Paper The Labor Market Determinants of Corporate Governance
Reform
Roger M. Barker, Oxford University
David Rueda, Oxford University
Overview: This paper analyses how change in labor markets
impacts on corporate governance, and the interaction of any such
change with partisanship
Paper The Business of Backlash: The Peculiar Counterattack on
Post-Enron Corporate Governance and Accounting Reforms
John W. Ciotti, University of California, Riverside
Overview: Business elites have attacked post-Enron corporate
governance and accounting reforms as inefficient. Contrary to the
rhetoric, the business backlash was triggered by anti-regulatory
ideology and interests in preserving managerial power.
Paper Why Do People Pay More Under Proportional Systems?
Electoral Systems, Corporate Governance and Price
Jaekwon Suh, University of California, Los Angeles
Overview: This paper explains cross–national variation of
competitive price levels measured by purchasing power parity
(PPP). The theoretical contribution of the paper is to show firm’s
price-asking behavior in a certain political environment.
Disc. Ronald Rogowski, University of California, Los Angeles
3-2 CORRUPTION AND RENT-SEEKING
Room Salon 2, 3 rd Floor, Thur at 12:45 pm
Chair Jorge Bravo, Duke University
Paper Corruption in Latin America: Political, Economic, and
Institutional Causes
Lauren V. Biddle, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Overview: This paper examines the political, economic, structural,
and institutional variables that affect perceptions of governmental
corruption in modern Latin America using a statistical analysis of
pooled cross-sectional time series data.
Paper How Does Vote Buying Affect Voters’ Perceptions of Political
Corruption? A Cross-National Study Among Developing
Countries
Tetsuya Fujiwara, Michigan State University
Overview: This paper examines the impact of vote buying on
voters’ perceptions of political corruption. When benefits transfer
from politicians to voters, it is hard to see how those benefits
influence corruption perceptions. I try to clarify this ambiguity.
Paper Rent-Seeking and the Search for Political Stability
Susanne D. Michalik, University of Konstanz
Laura Seelkopf, University of Konstanz
Overview: This study looks at the interaction of the two main
goals of politicians, staying in office and rent-seeking.
Page | 92
Paper Rethinking Political Power in Political Economy of Partial
Reforms
Qi Zhang, Northwestern University
Mingxing Liu, Peking University
Overview: Given reforming policies from the center, local
officials only implement those which benefit them and oppose
those which reduce their rent-seeking capacity. Our hypothesis is
confirmed by empirical evidence by examining partial reform in
rural China.
Disc. Daniel Gingerich, Princeton University
Jorge Bravo, Duke University
3-17 POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
Room Salon 4, 3 rd Floor, Thur at 12:45 pm
Chair Lauren M. Duquette, University of Chicago
Paper Democracy and Child Mortality: An Indirect Effect
John A. Doces, University of Southern California
Overview: This paper studies the impact of the size of the winning
coalition on the under-five mortality rate. The results indicate that
as the size of the winning coalition increases child mortality drops.
Paper Red Carpets or Iron Gates? The Political Economy of FDI
Regulation
Sinziana P. Dorobantu, Duke University
Overview: The paper investigates the political determinants of
national policy frameworks governing the entry and operations of
foreign-owned companies in developing countries.
Paper Logic of Financial Regulatory Reform in Mexico and South
Korea
Heon Joo Jung, University of Pennsylvania
Overview: This paper examines institutional design and change of
financial regulatory systems as responses to economic crises in
Mexico and South Korea by taking seriously the interaction
between international forces and public attention.
Paper State-Business Conflict and the Role of Reputation
Nimah Mazaheri, University of Washington
Overview: This paper examines state-business conflict during
economic development programs by focusing on the role that
reputation plays in the context of informal economic institutions.
Disc. Lauren M. Duquette, University of Chicago
3-26 TO SERVE AND PROTECT? THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Room PDR 4, 3 rd Floor, Thur at 12:45 pm
Chair Irfan Nooruddin, Ohio State University
Paper Political Violence: Can It Explain Africa’s Development?
Cristina Bodea, Michigan State University
Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, The World Bank
Overview: This paper assesses whether various types of organized
political violence (wars, coups, violent protest) have a differential
impact on growth and overall human development, and whether
and how the African continent is different in this regard.
Paper Collateral Damage: War, Infrastructure, and Public Health
Zaryab Iqbal, University of South Carolina
Overview: This paper investigates the effect of violent conflict on
the health achievement of states, and shows that a substantial
fraction of the overall health impact of war can be attributed to its
destructive potential.
Paper Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and
Democracies
Philip Keefer, The World Bank
Overview: This paper argues that political actors’ inability to
commit credibly to broad segments of society makes conflict more
likely. Empirical tests indicate the importance of institutionalized
political parties for dampening the threat of conflict.