2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

explores the implications that this shift holds for Rawls’ theory of
public reason.
Paper The Role of Reason and Faith for Jefferson and Locke
Ted Ritter, Furman University
Overview: This paper analyzes the role of faith and reason in the
philosphies of Jefferson and Locke.
Paper The Twilight of Probability: Locke, Bayle and the Toleration
of Atheists
Alex Schulman, University of California, Los Angeles
Overview: An examination of the contradictory attitudes of
political philosophers John Locke and Pierre Bayle about the
toleration of atheists, especially as this relates to shifting attitudes
in the early Enlightenment toward the limits of knowledge and
reason.
Paper In Strauss’ Athens, An Old City of Jerusalem
Gregory S. Weiner, Georgetown University
Overview: Leo Strauss insisted that “philosophy is radically
independent of faith,” with faith defined as reliance on an
unevident premise. But Natural Right and History is based on
such a premise: Strauss’ faith that the problem of natural right is
solvable.
Disc. David J. Lorenzo, Virginia Wesleyan College
33-13 DOES EQUALITY REQUIRE EQUAL
TREATMENT?
Room Dearborn 2, 7 th Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Peter M. Lindsay, Georgia State University
Paper In Pursuit of Political Equality: Selection of Legislators by
Lottery
Joel M. Parker, University of Texas, Austin
Overview: Political equality is impossible when selection of
representatives is conducted by election. Accordingly, I propose a
unicameral legislative branch, selected at random from the entire
adult citizenry.
Paper Can Deliberative Democracy Overcome Inequalities in
Epistemological Authority?
Jason L. Pierce, University of Dayton
Overview: Critics of deliberative democracy argue that
inequalities in epistemological authority plague deliberations.
This paper presents data showing that rules can be imposed to
overcome this hurdle and to foster more effective deliberation.
Disc. Peter M. Lindsay, Georgia State University
34-11 LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
Room Salon 7, 3 rd Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Keith L. Dougherty, University of Georgia
Paper A Dynamic Model of Legislative Bargaining
Tasos Kalandrakis, University of Rochester
John Duggan, University of Rochester
Overview: We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative bargaining in
which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo
in the next.
Paper Political Representation Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Seok-ju Cho, Yale University
Insun Kang, Duke University
Overview: We compare political representation under the
proportional representation system and the single member district
system by developing formal models of elections and legislative
votes.
Paper Sequential Committees
Matias Iaryczower, California Institute of Technology
Overview: A fairly common collective decision-making
mechanism requires the sequential approval of several
committees: a proposal is pitted against the status quo in one
committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration
in a second committee.
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Paper Legislative Preferences Over Agendas
David Epstein, Columbia University
Sharyn O'Halloran, Columbia University
Michael Ting, Columbia University
Overview: We construct a theory of legislative preferences over
agendas in a unidimensional policyspace.
Disc. Randall Calvert, Washington University, St. Louis
37-12 POLITICAL PARTIES: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE (Co-sponsored with European Politics,
see 7-17)
Room LaSalle 2, 7 th Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Riccardo Pelizzo, Singapore Management University
Paper Measuring and Explaining Public Funding for Parties in
Eastern Europe
Tatiana Kostadinova, Florida International University
Denitza Bojinova, University of Houston
Overview: Why do countries have different regimes of state
involvement in political party finance? The paper constructs an
index-measure of public funding of parties and tests a causal
model of its determinants with data from Eastern Europe.
Paper Motivations of Party-Based Euro-Skepticism in Eastern
Europe
Nicholas J. Clark, Indiana University
Rebekah Tromble, Indiana University
Overview: This paper examines Euro-skepticism in Eastern
European political parties. While the literature generally argues
for either strategic considerations or ideology, this paper finds that
both variables motivate positions on the European Union.
Paper Assessing the Consequences of Extreme Parties in Western
Europe
Jason M. Smith, Texas A&M University
Overview: This paper examines the effects of extreme parties on
the party systems of Western Europe. More specifically, it is
argued that the success of extreme parties on both sides of the
political spectrum have affected both the number of viable parties.
.Paper Candidate Prestige and Voting Behavior in European
Parliament Elections
Bjorn Hoyland, University of Oslo
Sara Hobolt, University of Oxford
Overview: This paper investigates the link between costly
campaign effort, electoral behavior and candidate activity in
European Parliament elections.
Disc. Riccardo Pelizzo, Singapore Management University
39-12 SPECIAL RULES IN THE HOUSE: CONTENT AND
CONSEQUENCES
Room Montrose 1, 7 th Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Gisela Sin, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Paper The Consequences of Legislative Rules Restricting Floor
Debate
Scott Cody, St. Louis Community College, Meramec
Overview: Using derivations of Krehbiel’s pivotal politics model,
different types of cloture rules are compared to determine their
effects on legislative outcomes. Empirical analysis is conducted
using data from state senates.
Paper Iron Fist or Velvet Glove? An Over-Time Analysis of Rules in
the U.S. House
J. Mark Wrighton, University of New Hampshire
John E. Owens, University of Westminster
Overview: This paper seeks to explain variations over time in
House rules restrictiveness. Using data from the 79th to 105th
Congresses, it assesses the impact of effective majority size, party
cohesiveness, and ideological distance from the chamber mean.
Paper Transparency of Congress: Important Legislation Hidden in
Procedural Votes
Milena I. Neshkova, Indiana University
Evan J. Ringquist, Indiana University
Overview: We assess transparency of Congress in six different
policy areas by examining how often and under what conditions
significant legislation (key votes identified by interest groups)
appear in form of procedural votes, breaking traceability chain.