2007 Conference Program - Midwest Political Science Association

13-9 POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL ECONOMY
Room Parlor H, 6 th Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Aleksandra J. Sznajder, Columbia University
Paper Reputation and the Rule of Law in Russia: A Survey
Timothy M. Frye, Columbia University
Overview: A survey-based experiment conducted in Russia in
2005 that indicates that good courts and a good reputation are
substitutes rather than complements.
Paper Financial Windfalls and Social Spending in the Post-Soviet
Countries
Sarah E. Wilson, Ohio State University
Quintin Beazer, Ohio State University
Overview: How do governments use financial windfalls? Using
the post-Soviet cases, we investigate how sudden changes in state
revenue affect the provision of social programs in countries with
varying degrees of democracy.
Paper Illiberal Regime Crises and Economic Elites: Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Serbia
John A. Gould, Colorado College
Carl L. Sickner, Colorado College
Overview: During illiberal regime crises economic elites may
switch allegiances from the regime to an opposition promising to
build the basic institutions of a market democracy. This paper
examines illiberal regime crises in Serbia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan.
Paper Bankers Alliances and Exchange Rate Policies in Transition
Economies
Jana Grittersova, Cornell University
Overview: What are the main determinants of exchange rate
choices? What are the structures and institutions that sustain
exchange rate policy of fixed regimes? This paper examines the
political determinants of the “actual” choice and sustainability of
exchange rate.
Paper Flexibility and Credibility: Myth of Foreign Direct Investment
in China
Yu Zheng, University of California, San Diego
Overview: I argue that China attracts FDI not despite its political
institutions, but partly because of them. The authoritarian regime
gave political elites the independence to initiate pro-capital
reforms that quickly improved the investment environment.
Disc. Stanislav Markus, Harvard University
Carol S. Leff, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
14-12 TRADE, DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT
Room Sandburg 2, 7 th Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Sean D. Ehrlich, Florida State University
Paper Does Democracy Promote Trade? Not Really
Christopher Balding, University of California, Irvine
Overview: There is a wealth of research on the impact of trade on
democracy and more specifically its impact on peace and
institution building. Many have taken this as an implicit belief
therefore that democracy promotes trade in spite of any systematic
study.
Paper Who Are Participants in Trade Conflicts? International and
Domestic Explanations of Trade Conflict Dyads
Jeffrey Drope, University of Miami
Wendy Hansen, University of New Mexico
Overview: Using trade conflicts as a measure of openness, we find
that regime type, characteristics of the involved industries and
larger geopolitical considerations most condition the nature of
formal trade conflicts.
Paper Trade Barriers and International Conflict
Patrick T. McEachern, Louisiana State University
Overview: Krasner’s index of trade “openness,” based upon tariff
levels, is often used to measure trade barriers. My measure
includes tariffs and non-tariff barriers. I use it to test the theory
that excluding foreign competition increases international conflict.
Paper Can We Trade Tyrannies for Democracy? An Empirical
Analysis
Jessica Xu, Yale University
Overview: Drawing upon a large panel data set covering 173
countries from 1950 to 2002, this paper examines the effect of
foreign trade on the chances of democratic arrival by using both
dynamic binary response models and the Cox duration model.
Paper For Whom Does Democracy Free Trade?
Daniel Y. Kono, University of California, Davis
Overview: Democracy leads to trade liberalization with some
trading partners but increased protection against others.
Disc. Sean D. Ehrlich, Florida State University
15-15 THE DOMESTIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS
Room Salon 5, 3 rd Floor, Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Terrence L. Chapman, Emory University
Paper Why Do Failed States Recover?
Desha M. Girod, Stanford University
Overview: Failed states recover when their leaders have an
incentive to use multilateral aid well. Leaders have this incentive
when they are resource-poor, when their only alternative is to look
to multilateral donors offering aid in exchange for reform.
Paper Military Occupations and the Quality of Governance -- 1945-
2000
Carmela Lutmar, Princeton University
Overview: The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically
the quality of governments that emerge once foreign military
occupations end in a large cross-section of countries in the post-
1945 period.
Paper Liberal Imperialism in the Age of Globalization
Leonid Kil, University of California, Berkeley
Overview: This article focuses on the sources of Russia's foreign
economic policy towards its "Near Abroad." It places the politics
of regionalization in the ex-Soviet space within the broader
context of incorporation of the whole zone into the world market.
Disc. Terrence L. Chapman, Emory University
17-15 THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERVENTION
Room Sandburg 8, 7 th Floor,. Sun at 8:00 am
Chair Stephen Gent, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Paper Who Recovers? International Intervention in Civil Wars and
Post-War Economic Growth
Yael Zeira, New York University
Overview: I study the relationship between international
intervention in civil wars and post-war economic growth. I find
robust empirical evidence that international intervention in civil
wars increases the average post-war rate of economic growth.
Paper Third Party Intervention and Outcomes in Interstate Conflicts
Renato Corbetta, University of Alabama, Birmingham
Regina Branton, Rice University
Overview: The paper tests propositions about the strategic
behavior of joiners by exploring whether third party intervention
affects the outcome on interstate disputes.
Paper Civil War, Contagion, and Intervention
Jacob D. Kathman, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Overview: This paper considers the war contagion predictors of
intervention in civil wars. The results indicate that as the risk of
diffusion rise to an increasingly salient region, the likelihood that
a third party will intervene also increases.
Paper Choosing Demands: An Empirical Test of Intervention and
Endogenous Demands
Amy T. Yuen, Emory University
Overview: This paper identifies and tests some important factors
that affect how demands are chosen strategically in the shadow of
intervention.
Disc. Brandon G. Valeriano, University of Illinois, Chicago
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