15.sējums - Valsts prezidenta kanceleja

Markku Jokisipilä. Between the Upper and Nether Stone
Hitler’s attitude towards the campaign in the East as well as those of other German
leaders with the exception of Alfred Rosenberg and Joachim von Ribbentrop was very
apolitical. He did not see it necessary or even desirable to mobilise any political support
from the occupied areas, although this support would have been easy to secure at
least at the early phases of Operation Barbarossa. Restoring of the independence of
the Baltic States was simply something that was completely out of the question for
him. Neither did he come to think of such a situation where the military setbacks would
make the active involvement of local people in labour and military duties a necessity.
In consequence of this basic definition of policy he saw no reason to pay any attention
to the reactions, wants and needs of the people living in these areas. 24
Very indicative of the attitudes of the German leadership is a statement by the
Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels, as written down in his diary entry of 16
March 1942:
“National movements are making themselves all the more visible in all former Baltic
States. Local people there apparently thought that German Wehrmacht was shedding
its blood in order to bring to power new indigenous governments for these midget
states, so that at the end of the war or possibly already earlier they could turn their
coats over and go to our enemy’s side. It is a childish and a naïve idea which has no
impact on us whatsoever. [..] National Socialism is considerably more cold-blooded and
realistic in these matters. It only does what is best for our own people, and in this case
the interests of the German people without a doubt call for a rigid implementation of
the German system without paying any attention to the demands of the local people,
be they justified or not.” 25
The Balts themselves of course saw the situation in an entirely different light.
Their starting point was the continuity of their states; the Soviet occupation had been
a criminal and a temporary act which had judicially in no way altered the sovereign
status of the Baltic States. Regardless of this basic principle the Balts were ready to
accept certain limitations to their sovereignty by the Germans, e. g. in foreign policy
decisions and in military co-operation. 26
However, the hopeful thinking of the Baltic people regarding the German intentions
took one blow after another. In the summer of 1941 many Balts would have been ready
and willing to extensive collaboration with the Germans, but the situation changed
rapidly. There were numerous reasons for dissatisfaction: German takeover of leading
positions in the local administration and economy, their rejection of establishing national
armies, postponement of giving back the private property nationalised during the Soviet
occupation and various privileges granted to the Germans just to name a few. On top
of all this the German army perpetrated outright atrocities as well. For example in
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