26.02.2013 Views

Commentary on Theories of Mathematics Education

Commentary on Theories of Mathematics Education

Commentary on Theories of Mathematics Education

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Networking <strong>of</strong> <strong>Theories</strong>—An Approach for Exploiting the Diversity 485<br />

Static and Dynamic Views <strong>on</strong> <strong>Theories</strong><br />

Mas<strong>on</strong> and Waywood distinguish between different characters <strong>of</strong> theories: foreground<br />

theories are local theories in mathematics educati<strong>on</strong> “about what does and<br />

can happen within and without educati<strong>on</strong>al instituti<strong>on</strong>s.” (Mas<strong>on</strong> and Waywood<br />

1996, p. 1056). In c<strong>on</strong>trast, background theory is a (mostly) c<strong>on</strong>sistent philosophical<br />

stance <strong>of</strong> or about mathematics educati<strong>on</strong> which “plays an important role in<br />

discerning and defining what kind <strong>of</strong> objects are to be studied, indeed, theoretical<br />

c<strong>on</strong>structs act to bring these objects into being” (Mas<strong>on</strong> and Waywood 1996,<br />

p. 1058). The background theory can comprise implicit parts that refer to epistemological,<br />

<strong>on</strong>tological or methodological ideas e.g. about the nature and aim <strong>of</strong> educati<strong>on</strong>,<br />

the nature <strong>of</strong> mathematics and the nature <strong>of</strong> mathematics educati<strong>on</strong>. Taking<br />

the noti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>of</strong> foreground and background theory as <strong>of</strong>fering relative, not absolute<br />

distincti<strong>on</strong>s, they can help to classify different views <strong>on</strong> theories.<br />

The diversity <strong>of</strong> characterizati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>of</strong> ‘theory’ cannot <strong>on</strong>ly be distinguished according<br />

to the focus <strong>on</strong> foreground or background theories, but also according to<br />

their general view <strong>on</strong> ‘theory’. For analytical reas<strong>on</strong>s, we distinguish<br />

• a normative more static view which regards theory as a human c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong> to<br />

present, organize and systematize a set <strong>of</strong> results about a piece <strong>of</strong> the real world,<br />

which then becomes a tool to be used. In this sense a theory is given to make sense<br />

<strong>of</strong> something in some kind and some way (for example Bernstein’s structuralist<br />

perspective, discussed by Gellert, in this volume).<br />

• and a more dynamic view which regards a theory as a tool in use rooted in some<br />

kind <strong>of</strong> philosophical background which has to be developed in a suitable way<br />

in order to answer a specific questi<strong>on</strong> about an object. In this sense the noti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

theory is embedded in the practical work <strong>of</strong> researchers. It is not ready for use, the<br />

theory has to be developed in order to answer a given questi<strong>on</strong> (for example, most<br />

researchers who follow an interpretative approach adhere this dynamic view <strong>on</strong><br />

theories for example Jungwirth, this volume). In this c<strong>on</strong>text, the term ‘theoretical<br />

approach’ is sometimes preferred to ‘theory’.<br />

Niss (2007) <strong>of</strong>fers a static view <strong>on</strong> the noti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> theory with his definiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

theory as<br />

an organized network <strong>of</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cepts (including ideas, noti<strong>on</strong>s, distincti<strong>on</strong>s, terms, etc.) and<br />

claims about some extensive domain, or a class <strong>of</strong> domains, c<strong>on</strong>sisting <strong>of</strong> objects, processes,<br />

situati<strong>on</strong>s, and phenomena. . . . In a theory, the c<strong>on</strong>cepts are linked in a c<strong>on</strong>nected hierarchy<br />

. . . [and] the claims are either basic hypotheses, assumpti<strong>on</strong>s, or axioms, taken as fundamental<br />

(i.e., not subject to discussi<strong>on</strong> within the boundary <strong>of</strong> the theory itself), or statements<br />

obtained from the fundamental claims by means <strong>of</strong> formal (including deductive) or material<br />

(i.e. experiential or experimental with regard to the domain(s) <strong>of</strong> the theory) derivati<strong>on</strong>s.”<br />

(Niss 2007, p. 1308)<br />

This characterizati<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> theories gives the impressi<strong>on</strong> that a theory can <strong>on</strong>ly be<br />

called a theory when it c<strong>on</strong>sists <strong>of</strong> a hierarchical c<strong>on</strong>ceptual structure and when<br />

its corpus <strong>of</strong> knowledge is well defined and deeply clear. However, accepted theories<br />

are not always explicitly clear in all these details, they do not always have a

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!