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Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System

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Beyond Victims’ Testimony 213<br />

The <strong>Court</strong> did warn, however, that not everything in a 911 call is<br />

necessarily non-testimonial. Once the purpose of dealing with the emergency<br />

subsides, statements can evolve into testimonial statements depending on the<br />

circumstances. The <strong>Court</strong> suggested that in those situations, the trial court can<br />

redact or exclude those portions of the 911 call that are not admissible under<br />

Crawford. The Supreme <strong>Court</strong> said that “trial courts will recognize the point at<br />

which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in response to interrogations<br />

become testimonial.” 46 In Davis, the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> was not asked to<br />

specifically address whether the victim’s later statements on the 911 tape in<br />

response to questioning by the operator were testimonial. The <strong>Court</strong> said that<br />

the only claim before it was the victim’s early statements to the operator<br />

identifying Davis. The <strong>Court</strong> pointed out that Davis did not challenge a finding<br />

by the trial court that, even if later parts of the 911 call were testimonial, their<br />

admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Since Davis did not<br />

challenge that ruling, the <strong>Court</strong> assumed the trial court ruling to be correct.<br />

Conversely, the <strong>Court</strong> found that the statements taken by police in Hammon<br />

were testimonial. The victim’s narrative, delivered when she was not in an<br />

immediate position of danger, was a description of past events. In addition, the<br />

<strong>Court</strong> rejected the finding of the Indiana Supreme <strong>Court</strong> that any initial inquiries<br />

at the crime scene cannot be testimonial, although the <strong>Court</strong> acknowledged that<br />

exigencies may exist such that initial inquiries produce non-testimonial<br />

statements while later statements are testimonial. The <strong>Court</strong> considered that<br />

Mrs. Hammon was physically removed from her husband’s presence, her<br />

statement was in response to police questions regarding past events, and they<br />

were taken “some time” after the events described had ended. As the statements<br />

were taken “under official interrogation [and] are an obvious substitute for live<br />

testimony,” the <strong>Court</strong> considered them inherently testimonial. 47<br />

The <strong>Court</strong> also rejected the argument that domestic violence cases require<br />

greater flexibility. While the <strong>Court</strong> acknowledged that “[t]his particular type of<br />

crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation and coercion of the victim to<br />

ensure that she does not testify at trial,” the <strong>Court</strong> nonetheless refused to “vitiate<br />

constitutional guarantees” under the Confrontation Clause. 48 However, the <strong>Court</strong><br />

also pointed out that the 6th Amendment does not render the courts without a<br />

remedy when defendants “act in ways that destroy the integrity of the criminaltrial<br />

system.” When it can be shown that the victim was coerced into silence by<br />

the offender, the trial court can determine whether the defendant has forfeited<br />

his right to exclusion of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.

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