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Lawyers Manual - Unified Court System

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Domestic Violence in the LGBT Communities 413<br />

14. Insured same-sex live-in partner was not a “spouse” entitled to<br />

underinsured motorist coverage under the supplementary uninsured<br />

motorist clause in the named insured’s automobile policy, even if the word<br />

“spouse” could be understood to include same-sex partners living together<br />

in a spousal-type relationship, absent evidence that the relationship<br />

between the two was of this nature. Dicta suggested that with evidence,<br />

same-sex couples might qualify as “spouse.” Ortiz v NYC Transit<br />

Authority, 267 AD2d 33 (1st Dept 1999). Unmarried same-sex couples are<br />

not considered “surviving spouses” under the Estates Power and Trust<br />

Laws (EPTL). In the Matter of Cooper, 149 Misc 2d 282 (Sur Ct Kings Co<br />

1990), aff’d, 187 AD2d 128 (2d Dept 1993), lv dism, 82 NY2d 128. Nor<br />

was a domestic partner of a flight attendant who died in an airplane crash a<br />

“surviving spouse” for purposes of seeking death benefits. Valentine v<br />

American Airlines, 17 AD3d 38 (3d Dept 2005). Similarly, derivative lossof-consortium<br />

claim can not be maintained based on claimant’s status as<br />

registered domestic partner in New York City because lawful marriage is<br />

required. Lennon v Charney, 797 NYS2d 891 (Sup Ct, Westchester County,<br />

2005). Most recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that<br />

a surviving partner of a same-sex Vermont civil union was not a “surviving<br />

spouse” within the meaning of the EPTL’s definition of classes of<br />

decedent’s distributees and therefore could not bring a wrongful death<br />

action arising from his partner’s death. The <strong>Court</strong> of Appeals dismissed<br />

appeal from the Second Department. Langan v St. Vincent’s Hospital of<br />

New York, 196 Misc 2d 440 (Sup Ct Nassau Co 2003), rev’d, 2005 WL<br />

2542658 (2d Dept 2005), app dism, 6 NY3d 890 (2006).<br />

15. Although we have found no case law on point, from speaking to trans<br />

activists and attorneys it appears that, for the purposes of the Family <strong>Court</strong><br />

Act or Domestic Relations Law, the courts will likely define an “opposite<br />

gender” partner as a partner with the gender that is the opposite of the trans<br />

client’s birth certificate gender (and not his/her gender identity if it is<br />

different from that of the gender on his/her birth certificate). For example,<br />

a male-to-female transwoman would identify as a woman, but if her birth<br />

certificate still reflects “male” as a gender, the courts will likely, for the<br />

purposes of granting marriage licenses, etc., define her as “male.”<br />

16. The <strong>Court</strong> of Appeals, in Hernandez v Robles, 794 NYS2d 579 (Sup Ct,<br />

NY County, 2005), rev’d and vacated, 26 AD3d 98 (1st Dept 2005), aff’d,<br />

2006 WL 1835429 (2006), held that the Domestic Relations Law<br />

prohibited same-sex marriage and did not violate the equal protection or<br />

due process clauses of the New York State Constitution, and that “. . .<br />

whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be<br />

determined by the Legislature.”

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