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12<br />

12.1 Introduction<br />

THE MONETARY AUTHORITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 353<br />

The Monetary Authorities<br />

<strong>and</strong> Financial Markets<br />

‘It's official. There is a Greenspan put option'. Financial Times,<br />

January 4, 2001.<br />

What you will learn in this chapter:<br />

• Why central bank action on official short-term rates has so much leverage<br />

over market rates<br />

• How the behaviour of financial markets may place constraints upon central<br />

bank <strong>policy</strong>-making<br />

• How information can be derived from financial markets that can help in making<br />

economic forecasts.<br />

In two other sections (4.2 <strong>and</strong> 9.4) where we refer to central bank instruments<br />

of <strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong> we drew attention to the recently emerged consensus<br />

that the only satisfactory instrument is the short-term rate of interest.<br />

We have also shown (in Section 4.2 especially) how central banks can use<br />

repo <strong>and</strong> similar money market deals to set the price at which reserves are<br />

made available to the banking system <strong>and</strong> we looked at how changes in official<br />

rates are reflected in other, market, short-term rates. In this chapter we<br />

are concerned with a broader question but one to which the interest rate setting<br />

process nonetheless has some connection. The big question is the relationship<br />

between central bank decision-making <strong>and</strong> financial markets <strong>and</strong><br />

one way of caricaturing the relationship is one of a struggle for power. The<br />

central bank wishes to set domestic interest rates at some target level for the<br />

achievement of <strong>its</strong> <strong>policy</strong> objectives but is reluctant to do so for fear that<br />

markets (typically the forex or bond markets) will react badly, pushing the<br />

exchange rate or long-term interest rates to undesirable levels. A variation<br />

on this theme, often expressed by critics of ‘globalisation’, is that the size<br />

<strong>and</strong> instability of international capital flows makes it virtually impossible<br />

for any but the very largest <strong>monetary</strong> authorities to operate an independent<br />

<strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong> (Cornford <strong>and</strong> Kregel, 1996; Mosley , 1997). If there is any<br />

truth in such a picture, however, one must wonder how it is that individual

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