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bain_y_howells__monetary_economics__policy_and_its_theoretical_basis

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376 MONETARY ECONOMICS<br />

13.2 The membership of <strong>monetary</strong> unions<br />

In principle, there is no difference between the operation of <strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong><br />

in a single nation state such as the UK <strong>and</strong> in a <strong>monetary</strong> union consisting<br />

of a number of nation states. In each case, a central bank operates a single<br />

<strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong> for the whole country or group of countries. In these<br />

times of independent central banks <strong>and</strong> the dominance of price stability as<br />

a <strong>policy</strong> goal, the constitutions <strong>and</strong> practices of the central banks are likely<br />

to have much in common. In no case are <strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong> decisions of the<br />

central bank likely to suit all regions or all economic sectors. Much of the<br />

debate over the European single currency has been of the ‘one interest rate<br />

does not suit all’ variety — that a <strong>policy</strong> decided by the ECB in Frankfurt<br />

might be helpful for some member states but not for others. Yet it is also<br />

true that an increase in interest rates by the Bank of Engl<strong>and</strong> that su<strong>its</strong> the<br />

south east of Engl<strong>and</strong> might not please manufacturing industry in Scotl<strong>and</strong><br />

or Northern Irel<strong>and</strong>. A difference between the two cases only arises if it is<br />

more likely that a central bank decision will be wrong for some parts of the<br />

euro area or that it will do more damage to some parts of the area than is the<br />

case for the UK. We are talking about questions of degree rather than principle.<br />

We could, thus, express the issues at the heart of the debate through<br />

the following questions:<br />

• How likely is it that the interest rate set by the central bank of a <strong>monetary</strong><br />

union will be unsuitable for some member countries?<br />

• How much damage is the wrong interest rate likely to do to those<br />

economies that it does not suit?<br />

• Are there other types of flexibility in the economy of the <strong>monetary</strong><br />

union that will help the disadvantaged economies to cope with the wrong<br />

interest rate decisions?<br />

• Are the likely costs of wrong interest rate decisions for some parts of<br />

the area likely to outweigh the benef<strong>its</strong> expected from the single currency?<br />

The usual <strong>theoretical</strong> approach to these questions is known as optimum currency<br />

area theory. This seeks to determine the optimum size <strong>and</strong> composition<br />

of a single currency area. The logic is clear. Start with a very small<br />

single currency area. Then, as the area is enlarged, the costs increase <strong>and</strong><br />

the net benef<strong>its</strong> (benef<strong>its</strong>−costs) of having a single currency decline. At<br />

some point, the benef<strong>its</strong> <strong>and</strong> the costs become equal <strong>and</strong> we have reached<br />

the optimum size. Beyond this, it would be advantageous to retain more

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