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bain_y_howells__monetary_economics__policy_and_its_theoretical_basis

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434 MONETARY ECONOMICS<br />

members of Congress twice a year. However, there is no political representation<br />

at FOMC meetings <strong>and</strong> a question we raised in relation to the ECB<br />

appears here also concerning the political remedy available if the people are<br />

unhappy with the Fed’s actions.<br />

This brings us back to the question of independence from the financial<br />

sector since financial markets can be seen to be the only part of the economy<br />

capable of damaging the Fed in response to the Fed’s policies. Through<br />

their actions, the financial markets can make it much more difficult for the<br />

central bank to fulfil <strong>its</strong> m<strong>and</strong>ate <strong>and</strong> can damage the reputations of central<br />

bankers. We have seen, in Chapter 13, a good example of this in relation to<br />

the value of the euro. The result of this is that the central bank might well<br />

feel <strong>its</strong>elf more accountable to financial markets than to the political system.<br />

It is of interest in this regard that, as we report above, the Fed recently<br />

changed the way in which it expresses <strong>its</strong> views about the future prospects<br />

of the economy because of concern over the way in which <strong>its</strong> comments<br />

were being interpreted in the financial markets. This, of course, provides<br />

another reason why the desire expressed in the constitution of the Fed when<br />

it was set up in 1913, that it should be independent of both private financial<br />

business interests <strong>and</strong> duly constituted government authorities might not, in<br />

practice, be possible.<br />

14.5 The Federal Reserve — recent <strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong><br />

The year 2001 saw the Fed principally concerned with the weakness of the<br />

US economy. As the US economy headed towards recession, there was no<br />

threat to the goal of price stability, <strong>and</strong> the Fed saw <strong>its</strong> task as cutting interest<br />

rates <strong>and</strong> providing generous liquidity to the banking system in the<br />

attempt to avoid recession. Concern about the future weakness of the economy<br />

intensified following the attack on the World Trade Centre <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Pentagon on 11 September.<br />

It is clear from the actions <strong>and</strong> comments of the FOMC that it believes<br />

that <strong>monetary</strong> <strong>policy</strong> does have powerful real effects, at least in the short to<br />

medium term. This was despite the fact that the interest rate cuts were well<br />

anticipated by the financial markets. Differences of opinion regarding likely<br />

cuts largely centred on whether the cut would be one-quarter or one-half<br />

of one per cent or on whether the cut would be this or next month. The markets<br />

were never genuinely taken by surprise. This confirms that <strong>monetary</strong><br />

<strong>policy</strong> is thought by practitioners to have powerful real effects whether <strong>policy</strong><br />

is anticipated or not. This does not, of course, refute the proposition that<br />

money is neutral in the long run, but market practitioners act as if:

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