Sanctioning Apartheid - KORA

Sanctioning Apartheid
Of immediate concern to the Frontline States is the need to
ensure that they are not unwitting parties to ~"spirades to
subvert sanctions. The two most obvious targets of South
Afrim attention are Botswana and M o q e (along with
Lesotho and Swaziland). Pretoria has already shown considerable
interest and ingenuity in takhg advantage of its shared
membeTship with the BrS (Botswana, htho, and Swaziland)
mmfries in the Southern African Customs Union to penetrate
and ovaseas markets; and the SLS stam have been fully
mepive to South African capital. As the Bobwanan Minister of
Cornmx and Industry explained with evident approval, in
mngmtulating a South African campany on the occasion of the
opening of its Gaborone shoe factmy "In this way, Edworks
hop that the products will be exported to EEC and the rest of
Africa, dhus taking full advantage of Botswana's preference in
thee markets under the Lome Convention and sther special
bilateral ktho and Swaziland have been at
least as energetic and successful in offering generous financial
inducements to enable South African companies to break out of
their isolation.
Maputo, too, is reportedly being used once again, as it was
by Rhodesia during UDI, as an entrepot for the bogus labelling
and false invoicing of South African exports and as a backdoor
for embargoed imports. In this connection, sllspidons concerning
the operations of Renfreight, the South African forwarding and
clearing agency that dominates the region, have led SAtlCC
govemmenIts to explore ways of loosening the ampany's grip on
their Wght handling business.7s What kas so far been overlooked,
however, is the artent ;to which foreign multhatiohals
with, inkre.& in the Frontline Stabs also profit from mIIUsion
with apartheid. As far as is Inown, although Lonrho has major
investments in evesy SAM=C state accept Angola, no ns leader
react4 publicly to its ("dirt cheap") prhse of Western
Platinum mine when Falconbridge fiftalEy decided to dispcse of
its South African
In present circumstances, the scope for FtS action on
sanctions is severely chmmsaibed. Even the few possibilities
that do exist carry with them an uncertain risk of ~~g swift
South African reprisals. Only if the Frontline States succeed in