Sanctioning Apartheid - KORA

Sanctioning Apartheid
African government has made clear that its approval of it was in
some sense a reward for Jonathan's overthrow and the more
accommodating stance of Lekhanya's government, and it is
wholly dependent on the cooperation of the South Ahican
government. Of course, the project is of vital sigru6cance to
continued industrial development in the core PWV (Rand) region
of South Africa, but South Africa could withstand a short delay,
whereas a Lesotho government cannot necessarily withstand even
temporary disruptions to normal commercial relations with South
Africa.
It would seem, therefore, that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the best assumption to make is that the government
of Lesotho will defend sanctions avoidance via capital flight to
the hilt and will condemn any instances of sanctions evasion that
come to light, but will make no great efforts to detect the latter.
Time will show if this is correct.
Notes
1. John E. Bardill and James H. Cobbe, Lesotk: D- of Depmdcncu
in Solrfhern AfriaP (Boulder, Co.; Westview Publishing Co., 1985);
James Cobbe, "EEonomic Aspects of Lesotho's Relations with South
Africa," Journal of Modem African Studies, m, 1 (1988), 7l-90.
2. Cobbe, "Economic Aspects of Lesotho's Relations." For a slightly
different view, see Robert Edgar, "Ihe Lesotho Coup of 1986,"
Sollth e n Rcvh rv (johannesburg: Ram Press, 19871,373482
3. Afriaa Cmr~~l, 4 March 15s.
4. 1986 Population Census Reliminary Results, Bureau of Statistics
CMaseru, ktho Government Printer, 1987); Unpublished working
tables, 1985/$6 Labour Force Survey, Btnau of Statistics.
5. See Ron de Vletkr's chapter in Carl Keyter, ed, The Rqmf on tk
Fmdmgs of the hmd Consultation on Migratimr and Dcodopmmt,