Sanctioning Apartheid - KORA

ed to the integrity of the South African Rand and mthtxn
Ahids fareign exchange situation.
From a Sauth Afrian peqxdxve the means b induce
coopration fall into cakpies of both carmb and -f
neward and of punishment On the one hand# carrot-lfke
indwmmnts would be the promise of Wonal fcdgn
investment, generating both anployment and new tax revenue as
well as opportunities for Batswam entrepreneurs. There might
be secrmdary linkages created and the opportunity to utilize
previously untapped raw materials in the Bobwam emnomy.
The gad of developing a more div& and inkgrated
economic system with the direct hvolvement of Batswana Capit'd
would pmMe a broad eoonomie: inducement
Athsametime,~arrtheo~~hd,SouthAfricakas
consisk~ shown itself capable of wielding a heaoy "stkk-"
What has kame a persistent policy of destabilimtion in the
region has sought to punish neighbo~ for their misdeeds. An
increase m the threat or use of military action could Ewriily
became a part of government-to-government relatiom in a
sandions mh-t of increasing intensity. There Is every
reasan to Meye hat the hth African govemmmt is prepad
b use its military apparatus to achiwe its: gods euwd the goals of
spedfic economic entities in the South African ecr,nmy.
Botswana ha been a regular target for such actions since June
1985, dthough so far apparently for political rather than econcunic
mmms. An intendyhg sanctions environment in fact
increasestheliMhoodthatthispatlernwillpersistdperhaps
becom~ more hpmt The insbwnents of coercion avdable to
Sauth Ahb are not solely military. There are economic "levers"
which south kkkh can maniphk. LRwis, for e~~mp1es, sets
the prmhmry pint of leverage in the South African mntro1 of the
main railway tramportation system in southern Africas
The Internal Calculus: Botswana in a Sanctions-
Bustjag Environment
Botswana aperimced tremendous growth in ithp post-
colonial pmd [ie, since 1% and particularky since 19693. A