Sanctioning Apartheid - KORA

Sanctions against South Afn'cn: Lesotho's Role 349
of South Africa's difficulties. More to the point, so far at least
Lesotho does not seem to be having much success in this
strategy, at least in relation to Swaziland or what might be
possible. As of late 1987, the only well documented cases
involved textiles and apparel, at least six export-oriented South
African companies being reporfed as having moved to Lesotho
since the 1986 coup? Nevertheless, L m
is upbeat about the
prospects, which include not only South African firms, but new
investments by firms from third countries chmsing a Lesotho
location over a South African one for partly political reasons.
The largest hown case is a Chinese-Hong Kong joint venture to
produce cotton cloth and denim for US and European markets,
employing 300 Basotho with an investment of $11 million10
Apart from its infrastrum problems, Lesotho is not too bad a
location for serving the major South African markets, and the
possibility that Japan may restrict investment in South Africa by
its firms more strictly than in the past may present some
opporhmities for Lesotho to acquire overseas manufacturing
investments aimed at the South African market
Apart from these possible positive consequences of restric-
tions on South Africa's exports, what other effects will sanctions
have on Lesotho? It depends, of course, on what the sanctions
are, and how the government of South Africa reacts to their
imposition. A true oil embargo, for example, would be potential-
ly devastating because Lesotho receives all its petroleum
products through normal commercial channels from the big five
foreign oil companies in South Africa. It is unlikely that it would
be easy to get oil through to Lesotho if it were not available in
South Africa.
Restrictions on imports into South Africa of high-tech
products will tend to raise costs for such goods to h tho. In
theory, Lesotho could be used as a route to break sanctions on
imports into South Africa, and at least for small quantities this
would be hard to detect. In practice, indications are that the
reverse is more likely; the embargoed goods will remain on sale
in South Africa (namely, Apple computers or Kodak film)
brought in by South African entrepreneurs by simpler routes
than airfreight or sealed container to Lesotho, and Lesotho will
continue to buy these goods from South African sources at slight-