21.08.2013 Views

Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Security 87<br />

standard [104] executed on a BTnode (source: [127]). As public exponent, the<br />

value F4 (hex) has been used. The numbers are averaged over 5 measurements<br />

per<strong>for</strong>med <strong>for</strong> each key size. Gura et al. [74] report on the per<strong>for</strong>mance of an<br />

optimized implementation of RSA and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)<br />

algorithm on the ATmega128 plat<strong>for</strong>m. For RSA, their implementation yields<br />

a 3- to 5-fold improved per<strong>for</strong>mance compared to the (more naive) implementation<br />

of [127]. However, the order of magnitude of these operations still prevents<br />

excessive usage of RSA. The ECC algorithm yields an improvement of<br />

one order of magnitude compared to RSA signature generation. This <strong>in</strong>dicates<br />

that ECC seems to have quite some potential <strong>for</strong> sensor networks; a library <strong>for</strong><br />

T<strong>in</strong>yOS is available [116].<br />

For comparison, Table 2.2 shows figures <strong>for</strong> different cryptographic primitives,<br />

namely AES encryption and hash<strong>in</strong>g. These numbers show that there is<br />

a vast difference between symmetric key cryptography and hash<strong>in</strong>g, and public<br />

key cryptography. They clearly <strong>in</strong>dicate that symmetric mechanisms have<br />

a significant advantage over public key cryptography from a per<strong>for</strong>mance perspective.<br />

Another issue with RSA are the relatively large key lengths. At least the<br />

public key and the accompany<strong>in</strong>g certificate (a signature) have to be exchanged<br />

<strong>for</strong> key agreement. For a key length of 1024 bit, this yields an additional overhead<br />

of 256 bytes <strong>in</strong> either direction. Compared to the typically very small size<br />

of data messages <strong>in</strong> a sensor network, this overhead is significant.<br />

3.4.3 Pairwise Key Distribution<br />

In a fully connected network of n nodes, each node ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s n − 1 connections.<br />

With each connection, a data structure is associated that uses up some<br />

space, say m bytes. There<strong>for</strong>e, each node has to store m(n − 1) bytes of state<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. Given M bytes devoted to stor<strong>in</strong>g such k<strong>in</strong>d of state <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation,<br />

the supported network size is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by n = M m + 1.<br />

As an example, let’s assume that with each node, a 32-bit (4 bytes) identifier<br />

(which may <strong>in</strong>clude a unique ID, location <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation, and possible other data)<br />

and a 128-bit (16 byte) key is associated. Thus, a node has to store m = 20<br />

bytes <strong>for</strong> each other node <strong>in</strong> the network. If a sensor node provides M = 100<br />

kbyte <strong>for</strong> security purposes, this allows a network size of n = 5000 nodes.<br />

Currently, microcontrollers used <strong>in</strong> sensor node prototypes provide up to<br />

512 Kbyte non-volatile data memory (Flash EEPROM), e.g. the MICA product<br />

l<strong>in</strong>e of Crossbow Technology Inc. Much of this space is used by code <strong>for</strong><br />

the operat<strong>in</strong>g system, network stacks, and applications. We can assume that

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!