Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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158 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserving Communications Definition 6.2. Key authentication is the property whereby one party is assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party (and possibly additional identified trusted parties) may gain access to a particular secret key. Definition 6.3. Data origin authentication is a type of authentication whereby a party is corroborated as the (original) source of specified data created at some (typically unspecified) time in the past. Definition 6.4. Data integrity is the property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since the time it was created, transmitted, or stored by an authorized source. In the course of this work, we most often refer to “messages” instead of “data”. As a message, we understand a container for data, which is represented in some encoded form. However, in many cases these terms are used interchangeably. Also, we talk about “hosts” or “nodes” instead of “parties”, but these terms are used interchangeably. There are a variety of methods for entity and message authentication being used. In the physical world, biometric techniques are used for authenticating human beings: Fingerprints may be used for entity authentication, while voice recognition is commonly used for entity and message authentication (over the phone, for exmple). In electronic communication systems, cryptographic, keybased methods are required. Standard mechanisms for authentication include digital signatures and message authentication codes (cf. 2.8.2). Maintaining data integrity is often achieved through mechanisms like redundant storage or checksums. This is sufficient to counter unsystematic errors which occur in natural phenomena like fatigue of material or random interference. In cases where data integrity is threatened by a skillful, malicious adversary, this is not sufficient. In such a case, data origin authentication through cryptographic means is used to detect unauthorized tampering with data. There is no known cryptographic primitive, which can be used to ensure integrity (against malicious adversaries) without recourse to authentication. It has to be stressed that node authentication alone does not guarantee correctness. A compromised node may correctly report its identity and authenticate its message as it is expected from a correctly operating node. However, the data it reports may be manipulated, and there may be no way of detecting such manipulations. This is the reason why node capture attacks are so powerful. The last two definitions will be the most important ones for this work, and both data integrity and data origin authentication (also called message authen-
6.1. Authentication and Integrity Protection 159 tication) are strongly related. We are going to discuss these issues in further detail in the following section. In order to make message authentication possible, some identity must be attributed to the source of a message. Otherwise, it would not be meaningful to claim that a message originated from some specific entity. The message source has to be described in a unique way to assign an identity to it. Usually, this is achieved by giving all potential sources (nodes) names that are unique within the respective frame of reference. This makes it possible to issue a statement like “message M originates from node p”, where M may be represented by a bitstring, and the name p by an integer, for example. The purpose of authenticating message M is then to yield evidence about the validity of that statement. When the authentication of message M is successful, the association to its source p is established. At the same time, it is ensured that M has not been changed since it was created by its source. Thus, authentication provides the authenticating party with two pieces of information about a message: 1. A source is attributed to the message. 2. The integrity of the message is ensured. In this regard, authenticity is a stronger property than integrity alone, since it implies integrity and additionally links an attribute (usually an identifier) of the source to a message. Vice versa, if the integrity of a message is violated, i.e. part of the message is altered or deleted, its authenticity (with regard to the statement above) is lost. Some considerations may illustrate this fact. If a message is altered (i.e. at least one bit changes) after the message has emerged from its source, a new message is in fact created. The original message has served as input for this transformation, and both messages may share large pieces of data. Still, two different messages now exist. And, unless the modification was done by the original source, they have different sources. Thereby, an altered piece of data looses its authenticity. Differently stated: If it is possible to verify that a message originates at the source that it is claimed to come from, this means that the message has not been changed since the time it emerged from its source. Such a verification is usually based on a statement issued by the source itself, which acknowledges that the source has created the message. This statement applies to the message in its specific form at creation time, and any change to the message invalidates the statement. These considerations are intended to illustrate that integrity can be achieved through authentication, and the violation of a message’s integrity makes it im-
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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Page 131 and 132: 4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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Page 135 and 136: 4.5. Strengthening Random Key Pre-D
Page 137 and 138: 4.6. Related Work 123 pc = 0.33 Du-
Page 139 and 140: 4.6. Related Work 125 Probability o
Page 141 and 142: 4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
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Page 145 and 146: 5.1. Principles of Multipath Commun
Page 147 and 148: 5.2. Routing on Spanning Trees 133
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Page 163 and 164: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 149 D
Page 165 and 166: 5.4. Security Evaluation 151 compro
Page 167 and 168: 5.5. Related Work 153 width usage a
Page 169 and 170: 5.5. Related Work 155 separation. F
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Page 175 and 176: 6.2. Basic Interleaved Authenticati
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Page 197 and 198: 6.4. Security Evaluation 183 Number
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Page 205 and 206: 6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the
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6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
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6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
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6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
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6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
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Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
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7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
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7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
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Bibliography [1] Specification of t
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Bibliography 225 1st European Works
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Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
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Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
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Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
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Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
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Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
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Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
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Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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