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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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182 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Communication</strong>s<br />

1000 nodes with a communication range r = 100 have been used, the simulated<br />

attack was a random spread attack. The figures show the absolute and relative<br />

errors of the approximation compared to the simulation result.<br />

For smaller numbers of compromised nodes, the approximation and the simulation<br />

results match quite well. Both the absolute and relative errors <strong>in</strong>crease<br />

but are with<strong>in</strong> acceptable limits – <strong>for</strong> x < N/4, the relative error rema<strong>in</strong>s below<br />

0.1 <strong>in</strong> both cases. For higher x, the error <strong>in</strong>creases slowly but rema<strong>in</strong>s below one<br />

until x ≈ 3 4N. Beyond that threshold, the relative error <strong>in</strong>creases rapidly. The<br />

approximation overestimates the number of non-compromised paths, lead<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

<strong>in</strong>accurate results <strong>for</strong> high values of x. However, the absolute error rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong><br />

the order of magnitude of the actual approximated values, so the approximation<br />

is qualitatively still useful.<br />

Number of functional paths<br />

250000<br />

200000<br />

150000<br />

100000<br />

50000<br />

0.0001<br />

0<br />

0 100 200 300 400 500 1e-05<br />

Number of compromised nodes<br />

CANVAS approximation<br />

CANVAS simulation<br />

Absolute error<br />

Relative error<br />

Figure 6.11: Precision of approximation compared to simulation, N = 500<br />

To conclude, Equation 6.4 gives a good estimate of the number of functional<br />

paths (or, equivalently, of the compromised paths) <strong>for</strong> smaller x assum<strong>in</strong>g a random<br />

spread attack. For other types of attacks we expect the approximation to be<br />

much less accurate. For structured attacks, the impact of a compromised node<br />

highly varies with its position relative to other compromised nodes. Especially<br />

the partition<strong>in</strong>g attack achieves a big impact with only a small set of nodes.<br />

Assum<strong>in</strong>g a k-connected graph, <strong>in</strong> the worst case (from the network operator<br />

po<strong>in</strong>t of view), the k nodes <strong>in</strong> the cut-off set and some of their neighbours are<br />

captured. This leads to a partition<strong>in</strong>g of the network. This could be achieved<br />

100<br />

10<br />

1<br />

0.1<br />

0.01<br />

0.001<br />

Relative error

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