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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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2.3. Related Network Types 23<br />

• Physical characteristics Nodes <strong>in</strong> ad hoc networks are usually more resourceful<br />

than sensor nodes. While sensor nodes are designed to be as<br />

small as possible, devices <strong>in</strong> ad hoc network<strong>in</strong>g are usually handled by a<br />

human user. There<strong>for</strong>e they cannot be arbitrarily small (which allows their<br />

microprocessors to be more powerful), and they must be equipped with a<br />

m<strong>in</strong>imal user <strong>in</strong>terface. Besides, their human users take care of recharg<strong>in</strong>g<br />

their batteries. In contrast, sensor nodes are often not accessible after<br />

deployment. They have to operate autonomously and manage with their<br />

limited energy supply.<br />

• Failure modes A device <strong>in</strong> an ad hoc network that stops work<strong>in</strong>g is likely<br />

to be replaced (or recharged) by its user, while a failed sensor node will<br />

hardly be noticed. A user will keep her devices under guard most of the<br />

time, and protect them aga<strong>in</strong>st external threats to her best abilities. <strong>Sensor</strong><br />

nodes are susceptible to external <strong>in</strong>fluences and may often be disabled by<br />

environmental conditions.<br />

User devices such as PDAs or mobile phones are often vulnerable to<br />

network-level attacks such as malicious code [102]. Although sensor<br />

nodes are not immune per se aga<strong>in</strong>st such threats, code <strong>in</strong>jection attacks<br />

require special equipment and are only possible <strong>in</strong> physical proximity to<br />

the device. Code <strong>in</strong>jection attacks are further impeded by the Harvard<br />

computer architecture that is often used <strong>in</strong> embedded microcontrollers.<br />

This architecture physically separates memory sections <strong>for</strong> code and data.<br />

It is thus possible to prevent un<strong>in</strong>tended code updates.<br />

• User vs location As devices <strong>in</strong> ad hoc networks are associated with human<br />

users, an attack on a device usually means that its owner, or rather<br />

personal <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation she possesses, is the actual target of the attack. In a<br />

sensor network, nodes are associated with locations rather than users. An<br />

attack on a sensor node may provide the adversary with some control over<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation associated with the node’s location. This may allow the adversary<br />

to observe an object (such as a human), but will not directly reveal<br />

sensitive <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about it.<br />

• Network scale In a sensor network, the number of nodes is usually very<br />

high, and so is the density, lead<strong>in</strong>g to some <strong>in</strong>herent redundancy. Tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

control over a s<strong>in</strong>gle node will not even allow the adversary to completely<br />

control the data flow <strong>in</strong> some area. Also, only the small fraction of the<br />

total network traffic pass<strong>in</strong>g through that one node will be revealed to the<br />

adversary. Ad hoc networks are usually smaller, and the significance of

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