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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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2.2. <strong>Sensor</strong> Node Characteristics 17<br />

the clients themselves. Cooperation between the clients is required <strong>in</strong> order<br />

to assure fair use of each other’s resources. Examples of such networks are<br />

overlay peer-to-peer networks, wireless ad hoc networks, and amateur radio<br />

networks (ham radio). <strong>Sensor</strong> networks based on this paradigm are simpler to<br />

set up than those of the previous type. Often, it is possible to simply deploy the<br />

nodes randomly with<strong>in</strong> an area. However, the algorithms and protocols used <strong>in</strong><br />

such networks are usually more complicated s<strong>in</strong>ce the nodes have to collaborate<br />

<strong>in</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g network services and there is no global view of the network’s<br />

state.<br />

In practice, most networks will probably be a mixture of these two extreme<br />

<strong>in</strong>carnations. Both designs may exist <strong>in</strong> parallel <strong>in</strong> the same network: <strong>in</strong>accessible<br />

areas may be covered by randomly deployed, self-organiz<strong>in</strong>g nodes,<br />

while populated areas may be covered with the use of base stations. Or, a network<br />

may be basically self-organiz<strong>in</strong>g with few base stations spread randomly<br />

throughout the network area, provid<strong>in</strong>g access po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>for</strong> external clients, <strong>for</strong><br />

example, but without full coverage. A network may also exist temporarily <strong>in</strong><br />

environments where no base station is available, <strong>for</strong> example a group of mobile<br />

sensors dur<strong>in</strong>g transportation.<br />

Base stations can provide certa<strong>in</strong> security services, such as authenticated<br />

broadcast (cf. the µTESLA protocol [142]), <strong>for</strong> example <strong>for</strong> distribut<strong>in</strong>g code<br />

updates, or act<strong>in</strong>g as trusted third parties <strong>for</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g secure l<strong>in</strong>ks between<br />

nodes as each node ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s a trust relationship to a base station. Generally,<br />

they are not as restricted as sensor nodes and thus the extensive use of public<br />

key cryptography is possible.<br />

For the purpose of our considerations regard<strong>in</strong>g security, we do not rely<br />

on base stations or any support<strong>in</strong>g network <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>for</strong> communication<br />

with<strong>in</strong> the sensor network. The deployment of an <strong>in</strong>frastructure is costly and<br />

not always possible, there<strong>for</strong>e we want to avoid rely<strong>in</strong>g on it <strong>for</strong> security purposes.<br />

In fact, base stations do not only offer new opportunities <strong>for</strong> security<br />

services, but also <strong>in</strong>troduce risks similar to those <strong>in</strong> heterogeneous networks<br />

(see the previous subsection).<br />

The lack of an <strong>in</strong>frastructure means that all security-relevant decisions have<br />

to be made autonomously by the network, <strong>for</strong> example whether a query is authorized<br />

to access certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. Such access control decisions should be<br />

made by collaborations of sensor nodes [17].

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