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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Cha<strong>in</strong>s 111<br />

Algorithm 1 Determ<strong>in</strong>e common key<br />

Global values:<br />

h: a one-way hash function<br />

Input:<br />

X: ID of the local entity execut<strong>in</strong>g the algorithm<br />

Y : ID of the peer entity<br />

ωX,HX: local hash cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation<br />

Output:<br />

The common cha<strong>in</strong> key K<br />

1: send(ωX)<br />

2: ωY := receive()<br />

3: if ωX < ωY then<br />

4: K := h ωY −ωX (HX)<br />

5: else<br />

6: K := HX<br />

7: end if<br />

8: return K<br />

Key agreement Alice and Bob agree on a common value us<strong>in</strong>g the hash cha<strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way. First, they exchange their cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dices. Then, they select<br />

the cha<strong>in</strong> value that is “lower” <strong>in</strong> the cha<strong>in</strong>, i.e. the one with the bigger position<br />

<strong>in</strong>dex, as their common value. The agreed-upon value K will either be σ[ωA] or<br />

σ[ωB]:<br />

K = σ[max(ωA,ωB)]<br />

The node whose value is “higher” (i.e., closer to the seed) <strong>in</strong> the cha<strong>in</strong> per<strong>for</strong>ms<br />

a number of applications of the hash function to eventually arrive at the<br />

other node’s value. This number is determ<strong>in</strong>ed by the difference between both<br />

position <strong>in</strong>dices. This procedure is described as Algorithm 1.<br />

Example 2 (Key agreement based on a hash cha<strong>in</strong>). Consider the situation <strong>in</strong><br />

Figure 4.3 where a hash cha<strong>in</strong> of length seven is shown (only <strong>in</strong>dices, no key<br />

values are visible). Alice’s value ωA = 2 is “higher” <strong>in</strong> the hash cha<strong>in</strong> than<br />

Bob’s value ωB = 4. There<strong>for</strong>e, the agree-upon common value will be σ[ωB].<br />

Alice per<strong>for</strong>ms two hash computations to obta<strong>in</strong> Bob’s cha<strong>in</strong> value from σ[ωA].<br />

Note that Bob cannot construct Alice’s value σ[ωA] on his own and also does<br />

not learn that value dur<strong>in</strong>g the protocol’s execution.<br />

4.3.3 Cha<strong>in</strong> Key Resilience<br />

Let’s assume that there is an adversary Eve who tries to sneak on Alice and<br />

Bob’s communication, i.e. carry out an attack on the confidentiality of their

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