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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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56 Chapter 2. <strong>Wireless</strong> <strong>Sensor</strong> <strong>Networks</strong> and Their Security<br />

establish pairwise secret keys between arbitrary pairs of nodes.<br />

• Entity authentication – By means of a challenge/response protocol, a key<br />

can prove its knowledge of a certa<strong>in</strong> secret key and thus demonstrate its<br />

identity and liveness.<br />

Once a key has been established between two communicat<strong>in</strong>g entities (either<br />

two sensor nodes or a node and the base station), this key can serve as a master<br />

key <strong>for</strong> deriv<strong>in</strong>g actual communication keys that are only used <strong>for</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong><br />

time span. This makes cryptographic attacks on the communication harder,<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce only a limited amount of data is available <strong>for</strong> cryptanalysis. Also, if<br />

a communication key happens to be exposed to the attacker, only a limited<br />

amount of data is compromised. In sensor networks, long-term relationships<br />

between pairs of nodes exist ma<strong>in</strong>ly between neighbour<strong>in</strong>g nodes. Generat<strong>in</strong>g<br />

a fresh communication key <strong>for</strong> their communication is desirable. Long-range<br />

communication between nodes is usually sparse and not bound to dist<strong>in</strong>ct nodes<br />

but happens rather between node clusters or groups. Frequent updates to these<br />

communication keys may not be necessary <strong>in</strong> many cases.<br />

Key revocation <strong>in</strong> sensor networks has the goal of exclud<strong>in</strong>g specific nodes<br />

from future communication after it has been detected that the key material of<br />

these nodes has been exposed to the attacker, <strong>for</strong> example after a node capture.<br />

Such nodes must not be allowed to further participate <strong>in</strong> the operation of the<br />

network. Additionally, the key material shared between compromised nodes<br />

and others should not be used anymore and keys that have been established<br />

based on this material may have to be renewed. This is especially important<br />

<strong>in</strong> cases where it has to be assumed that the attacker has recorded all previous<br />

traffic.<br />

Revok<strong>in</strong>g keys is an expensive operation <strong>in</strong> a sensor network as it cannot<br />

be expected that nodes regularly check a central repository of revoked keys.<br />

Thus, revocations have to be actively distributed throughout the network to be<br />

effective. These messages may become large if a large amount of key material<br />

is affected such as <strong>in</strong> pool-based schemes. The follow-up key re-negotiations<br />

put further load on the nodes.<br />

Another problem is the detection of compromised nodes, which is necessary<br />

to <strong>in</strong>itiate a key recovation procedure. In general, this is only possible through<br />

aberrant behaviour of nodes or through external means such as surveillance.<br />

A sophisticated attacker might avoid detection by not substantially alter<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

behaviour of captured nodes, and surveillance may not be possible or too expensive.<br />

Yet another problem of revocation is possible abuse by an attacker. It may

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