Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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190 Chapter 6. Integrity-Preserving Communications This picture corresponds well with the functional path quotient Ψ shown in Figure 6.16. Indeed, as Figure 6.18 illustrates, there is a strong correspondence between the two security measures. This correspondence can be explained by the dependency of consensus on the availability of functional communication paths. In an end-to-end scheme, this dependency is not given – all paths with uncompromised endpoints are considered functional. 6.4.4 Addressing Message Injection As laid out in this chapter, the Canvas protocol can only be applied if one is willing to accept a certain risk of message manipulation. Another risk is message injection. The authentication strength of Canvas could be considered “weak”, in contrast to end-to-end authentication as two compromised nodes could, at any time, create a new message, both sign it, and pass it on to another node. This (legitimate) node would accept the message and pass it on to its destination. This, of course, could lead to an overwhelming amount of fake messages in the network. The legitimate fraction of messages could sink below a threshold, where its impact on the operational outcome of the network would become neglibile. This can quickly render data collecting applications useless, since the most data they receive (and pass on) would be garbage. The amount of fake messages, which can be produced by a set of compromised nodes, can be limited by a number of means. They all impose certain rules on the behaviour of nodes. Any violation of these rules would lead to attack detection. Since it may not be clear which node exactly is compromised, this could be considered a weak form of intrusion detection. Limit Sending Rate One of the immediate countermeasures against heavy message injections is to limit the rate by which a node can issue messages. A node receiving more than a threshold of messages from a single source would immediately stop accepting them and issue a warning. This limits the overall fraction of fake messages. It also limits the impact of fake messages that are received by a single node. Clocked Transmissions A simple model avoids, by definition, message injection. In this model, message transmission is only possible in certain time slots. Time slots are arranged in phases that are (loosely) synchronized throughout the network. The duration
6.4. Security Evaluation 191 of the phase allows that each node can send exactly one message to each of its neighbours. The model also demands that in each slot a message must be sent. By construction, this forbids the possibility of message injection. Message Sequence Numbers Any node issuing a message must attach a sequence number to it. A node receiving multiple messages from the same source would then be able to notice the existence of injected messages if the same sequence number is used twice. A message injection attack might be successful for a certain period of time, until the original source starts emitting messages to the same recipients as the attacker. If one of them reaches a recipient, the attack is detected. Source Address Verification We describe two approaches to source address verification: one that relies on the cooperation of the source’s neighbours; and a second one that challenges the source on a random basis. Both procedures could be combined and thus further reduce the risk of message injection. The first approach is based on monitoring. Whenever a new message is created, it must be broadcast. This ensures that a number of nodes get a copy of the message. In many cases, broadcast channels are used by default, thus no additional changes are required. When the second node passes the message on, it also has to broadcast the message. This adds more nodes to those that know the message. Now, a consensus protocol is executed between the knowing nodes. Only if an agreement can be achieved, the third node on the path is allowed to accept the message. This approach has a number of drawbacks. First, potentially many nodes are participating in the consensus protocol, which implies a significant effort. Second, it only works if there are neighbours available. A third drawback is the requirement that messages must be sent in cleartext, i.e. without a link layer encryption step, at least for the duration of the agreement phase. The second approach requires additional message exchange between the source and the receiver. The receiver of a message may send a challenge to the original sender. This challenge contains part of the received message such that the sender can verify if the sender is the source of the message. If this is the case, the sender returns an acknowledgement. Only if the acknowledgement is correctly received, the receiver will accept the message. The challenge is useful in another way, too. If a node gets a challenge about a message that it has not issued, this indicates the presence of an attacker. This
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Diss. ETH Nr. 18174 Protocols for S
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ii often ad hoc and transient natur
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iv Dieses Ziel kann durch kryptogra
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Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Backg
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Contents ix 3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
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Contents xi 6.3 Performance Evaluat
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Backgrou
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1.3. Contributions 3 on the other h
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1.4. Thesis Outline 5 • Mario Str
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Chapter 2 Wireless Sensor Networks
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.1. Applications of Wireless Senso
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2.2. Sensor Node Characteristics 13
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2.3. Related Network Types 21 zero,
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2.3. Related Network Types 23 • P
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2.3. Related Network Types 25 PAN,
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2.4. Related Device Types 27 in con
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2.4. Related Device Types 29 ports
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 31 both
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2.5. Sensor Network Models 33 are a
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2.6. Simulation of Sensor Networks
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2.7. Security Requirements 41 terac
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2.7. Security Requirements 43 netwo
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2.7. Security Requirements 45 acces
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2.7. Security Requirements 47 2.7.6
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2.7. Security Requirements 49 of te
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2.8. Cryptography for Sensor Networ
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2.9. Existing Approaches to Wireles
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Chapter 3 A Security Model for Wire
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3.1. Attack Paths 67 field (cf. [17
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3.1. Attack Paths 69 modules [63].
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3.1. Attack Paths 71 closed environ
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3.2. Attack Objectives 73 • Timel
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3.2. Attack Objectives 75 Critical
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3.2. Attack Objectives 77 Actors A
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 79 a
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 81 c
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3.3. Adversary Characteristics 83 p
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.4. The Cost of End-to-End Securit
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3.5. Approximating End-to-End Secur
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3.7. Summary 95 Location-constraine
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Chapter 4 Key Establishment Shared
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4.2. Random Key Pre-Distribution 99
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4.3. Key Agreement Based on Hash Ch
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.4. Multiple Hash Chains for Key A
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4.5. Strengthening Random Key Pre-D
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4.6. Related Work 123 pc = 0.33 Du-
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4.6. Related Work 125 Probability o
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4.7. Summary 127 The security of th
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Chapter 5 Multipath Communication T
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5.1. Principles of Multipath Commun
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5.2. Routing on Spanning Trees 133
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Page 155 and 156: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 141 b
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Page 159 and 160: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 145 n
Page 161 and 162: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 147 F
Page 163 and 164: 5.3. Properties of Tree Paths 149 D
Page 165 and 166: 5.4. Security Evaluation 151 compro
Page 167 and 168: 5.5. Related Work 153 width usage a
Page 169 and 170: 5.5. Related Work 155 separation. F
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Page 173 and 174: 6.1. Authentication and Integrity P
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Page 189 and 190: 6.3. Performance Evaluation 175 A B
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Page 193 and 194: 6.4. Security Evaluation 179 Bandwi
Page 195 and 196: 6.4. Security Evaluation 181 a sens
Page 197 and 198: 6.4. Security Evaluation 183 Number
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Page 201 and 202: 6.4. Security Evaluation 187 Paths
Page 203: 6.4. Security Evaluation 189 ity of
Page 207 and 208: 6.4. Security Evaluation 193 The se
Page 209 and 210: 6.5. Extended Interleaved Authentic
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Page 223 and 224: 6.7. Applications 209 Psi 1 0.8 0.6
Page 225 and 226: 6.7. Applications 211 codes are att
Page 227 and 228: 6.7. Applications 213 domain. The r
Page 229 and 230: 6.9. Summary 215 simulations and by
Page 231 and 232: Chapter 7 Conclusion This work prop
Page 233 and 234: 7.1. Secure Communication in Wirele
Page 235 and 236: 7.2. Future Work 221 7.1.4 Shortcut
Page 237 and 238: Bibliography [1] Specification of t
Page 239 and 240: Bibliography 225 1st European Works
Page 241 and 242: Bibliography 227 [41] Rohan Chitrad
Page 243 and 244: Bibliography 229 [64] L. Eschenauer
Page 245 and 246: Bibliography 231 [85] Yahoo! Inc. D
Page 247 and 248: Bibliography 233 [105] Kristof Van
Page 249 and 250: Bibliography 235 [126] Anne Marie M
Page 251 and 252: Bibliography 237 [150] Sylvia Ratna
Page 253 and 254: Bibliography 239 [172] Thanos Stath
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Bibliography 241 [192] Eric W. Weis
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Curriculum Vitae Harald Vogt Person
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