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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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Chapter 4<br />

Key Establishment<br />

Shared secret keys are a prerequisite <strong>for</strong> communication that is secured by<br />

cryptographic means with regard to the three “classical” security properties:<br />

confidentiality, <strong>in</strong>tegrity, and authentication. In wireless sensor networks, confidentiality<br />

is important if, <strong>for</strong> example, sensor read<strong>in</strong>gs or aggregated data<br />

are regarded as secrets that have to be protected aga<strong>in</strong>st unauthorized read<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Integrity and authentication are required <strong>for</strong> WSNs that operate <strong>in</strong> critical environments<br />

where the manipulation of data may have harmful consequences.<br />

In communicat<strong>in</strong>g systems, cryptographic keys can be established <strong>in</strong> a variety<br />

of ways, which can be broadly categorized <strong>in</strong> two classes. The first is<br />

ususally described as key exchange: Two (or more) parties each contribute a<br />

partial key that are comb<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>to the f<strong>in</strong>al key. A key exchange protocol solves<br />

the problem of how to efficiently convey the partial key to the other party without<br />

compromis<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>al key. The second class is usually called key agreement.<br />

Here, it is not necessary that both parties contribute key material. The<br />

f<strong>in</strong>al key can be chosen externally (and both parties simply agree to use it), or<br />

it can be assigned by one party to the other. Such a case is sometimes called<br />

key transport.<br />

In identity-based key agreement protocols, the only <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation that may be<br />

exchanged are the identities of the <strong>in</strong>volved parties. Identities are not equivalent<br />

to keys as they are (often) not randomly chosen, static, and public. Based on<br />

the identities, the shared key is determ<strong>in</strong>ed. This often <strong>in</strong>volves the use of<br />

additional key material, which can be either (pseudo-)randomly constructed or<br />

could be already present. The latter case is the result of key pre-distribution.<br />

In this chapter, we describe identity-based key agreement protocols <strong>for</strong> wireless<br />

sensor networks. The properties of such protocols match the resource constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

of WSNs such that they are advantageous over alternative key agreement<br />

approaches.

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