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Protocols for Secure Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks

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156 Chapter 5. Multipath <strong>Communication</strong><br />

Threshold security schemes can cope with up to k compromised parties,<br />

which could be represented by nodes, l<strong>in</strong>ks, or paths, <strong>for</strong> example. A (n,t)threshold<br />

scheme is def<strong>in</strong>ed by the number of shares n and the m<strong>in</strong>imum number<br />

t of shares that are necessary and sufficient to reconstruct the secret d. The<br />

security of the scheme relies on its properties: (1) less than t parties cannot<br />

construct d (2) any set of t dist<strong>in</strong>ct shares is sufficient to construct d.<br />

As shown <strong>in</strong> [56], 2k+1 disjo<strong>in</strong>t paths are required to obta<strong>in</strong> secure message<br />

transmission when faced with a k-bounded attacker who completely controls k<br />

paths, i.e. can read and write messages at will on these paths. Intuitively, this<br />

result is obta<strong>in</strong>ed by encod<strong>in</strong>g and splitt<strong>in</strong>g up a message such that (1) k + 1<br />

correct parts are sufficient and necessary to reconstruct the message and (2) no<br />

<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation about the message can be learned by read<strong>in</strong>g k or less parts.<br />

When us<strong>in</strong>g multipath rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> order to achieve a security goal, such as<br />

confidentiality or <strong>in</strong>tegrity, one must not only th<strong>in</strong>k about encod<strong>in</strong>g and rout<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the messages themselves. It is also important to consider the possibility<br />

that the adversary tries to manipulate the process by which the used paths are<br />

constructed. If the adversary manages to conv<strong>in</strong>ce a sender that multiple disjo<strong>in</strong>t<br />

paths exist while <strong>in</strong> fact there is only one path that is controlled by the<br />

adversary, the sender cannot communicate securely. This issue is addressed<br />

<strong>in</strong> [10], where an algorithm is described <strong>for</strong> construct<strong>in</strong>g edge-disjo<strong>in</strong>t paths<br />

that is itself resilient aga<strong>in</strong>st attacks.<br />

5.6 Summary<br />

Establish<strong>in</strong>g short multiple disjo<strong>in</strong>t paths <strong>in</strong> a network may be hard, thus we<br />

devised a method that yields longer paths but makes path set-up very easy. Our<br />

method has the additional advantage that the constructed paths are spatially<br />

separated, which can be an advantage <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> attack scenarios.<br />

In general, establish<strong>in</strong>g disjo<strong>in</strong>t paths <strong>in</strong>volves a trade-off between set-up<br />

complexity and path length. In order to m<strong>in</strong>imize path lengths, a set-up procedure<br />

is required that <strong>in</strong>volves complex message exchanges and keep<strong>in</strong>g local<br />

state <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation. On the other hand, a simple procedure can be used if longer<br />

path lengths are acceptable.

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